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1 Introduction
Recent research has drawn an ominous picture of the implications of cultural heterogeneity on social
peace and economic growth. A large literature shows a negative relationship, though not always
robust, between ethnic diversity and the quality of public goods (Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina and La
Ferrara, 2000; Miguel, 2004; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005), welfare spending (Luttmer, 2001), civil con-
ﬂict and trust (Fearon and Laitin, 2000; Putnam, 2007; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002) and economic
growth (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999). The leading explanation of why ethnic fragmentation
aﬀects those outcomes is the failure to overcome the free-rider problem in more diverse societies,
which undermines collective action for public good provision, lobbying, or control over institutions.
This paper contributes to this literature by looking at the eﬀect of ethnic diversity on public goods
and social relations within local communities at the housing block level, relying on a natural exper-
iment to identify the causal eﬀect of diversity on those outcomes.
Our ﬁrst contribution is to deal with the issue of causality in the relationship between diversity
and economic and social outcomes. The general concern in this literature is that the endogenous
residential sorting of individuals on ethnic grounds biases the estimate of the impact of diversity. We
address this issue by using a natural experiment in which households in France are allocated to pub-
lic housing blocks without taking their ethnic origin or their preference for diversity into account.
Due to a strongly republican ideology, the French public housing system allocates state planned
moderate cost rental apartments (HLMs - Habitations à Loyer Modéré) to natives and immigrants
without concern for their cultural and ethnic background, mixing people indiscriminately. Some
HLM neighborhoods are consequently quite diverse, and others quite homogeneous. Furthermore,
HLM inhabitants rarely move, as the rents are much lower than market rates, and movement be-
tween HLMs is quite diﬃcult. Consequently, residents cannot choose whether to live near people like
themselves. Rather, they accept their placement, whether next to co-ethnics or strangers. Method-
ologically, this means that we can take the degree of diversity in any one HLM as exogenous, connect
the level of diversity with the housing situation, and examine whether greater heterogeneity leads
to poorer provision of public goods or more troubled social relationships in French communities.
We extensively document the actual process of allocation of households within the public housing
sector. We show that legal rules prohibit housing allocation based on ethnic backgrounds and that
in practice, the characteristics of the public housing sector make it very complicated to bypass the
law. Then, we conduct a variety of formal statistical tests to verify the absence of self-sorting on
ethnic characteristics.
Naturally, this paper is not the ﬁrst one to try to overcome this identiﬁcation issue. But pre-
vious attempts to establish causality rely mainly on instrumental variables.1 However convincing
the instruments might be, this strategy cannot overcome the concern as to whether the instruments
fulﬁll the exclusion restriction and do not have a direct eﬀect on public goods. For instance, Miguel
1In their seminal contribution to the literature, Alesina et al. (1999) provide a ﬁrst attempt to deal with this
endogeneity issue by collecting data at diﬀerent levels of aggregation (cities, metropolitan areas and counties). Their
assumption is that diﬀerent levels of aggregation allow for the correction of the potential biases introduced by Tiebout
sorting.
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(2004) and Miguel and Gugerty (2005) use the pre-colonial patterns of settlement as instruments,
assuming that these variables have no direct impact on present-day ethnic relations. More recently
Glennerster et al. (2010) have also relied on historical data of fractionalization as an instrument.
But since past settlement patterns are likely to have at least some direct impact on present-day
ethnic relations, the exclusion restriction might still be violated. Using a natural experiment with
exogenous allocation of ethnic groups is thus an alternative strategy to deal with these traditional
caveats. The paper which is the closest to ours is Dahlberg et al. (2011), which uses a nation-wide
policy intervention program that exogenously placed refugees coming to Sweden among the Swedish
municipalities. However, their paper examines in-group bias in preferences for redistribution and
not at the eﬀect of diversity on public goods and social relationships.
The second contribution of our paper is to identify the eﬀect of ethnic diversity on social rela-
tionships and the quality of public goods at a very local block level. We use micro data on housing
conditions where the units of observation are public housing blocks made up of around twenty
adjacent households. This is a key improvement for the analysis of how diversity shapes social re-
lationships compared to the previous literature which is based on aggregated data at the county,
regional or country levels. Diversity might matter for various reasons at diﬀerent levels and the
channels through which diversity operates is likely to depend on the size of the unit of observation.
By focusing on the provision of public goods at an aggregate level, the previous literature is mainly
interested in the eﬀect of diversity on collective action through lobbying or patronage (see Alesina
and La Ferrara (2005) for a survey). Instead, we analyze in this paper how diversity within a small
community aﬀects individual well-being and satisfaction with housing conditions. In addition, the
Housing Survey reports speciﬁc information about the neglect and voluntary degradations of the
public areas, the quality of the housing, and direct interpersonal conﬂicts. These data enable us to
identify various eﬀects of diversity on local public good outcomes, and to deeply explore the possible
channels explaining this relationship.
When residents report that vandalism is rife in their housing unit, we interpret this as a result of
the failure on the part of residents to develop norms that would punish miscreants. When residents
report the breakdown and the poor quality of basic facilities (such as heating and soundprooﬁng),
we interpret this as a result of a diminished capacity for collective action for social improvement.
Those goods are not directly degraded by diversity. But the irregularity of maintenance and the
absence of repairs in more diverse blocks might be associated with lower ability for collective action.
In this case, the result could be supported in equilibrium if the housing directorate reckons that it
can neglect facilities in ethnically heterogeneous housing projects, knowing that it will not face col-
lective action from its residents demanding better services. Finally, when residents report incidents
of direct civil conﬂicts, we can interpret this as an eﬀect of diversity on social relationships and the
failure by the state to give proper police protection in certain neighborhoods.
Since we have a much more detailed level of analysis of diversity and public spaces than the
previous literature, we do not have access to precise objective indicators. One might thus be worried
that our analysis draws exclusively on subjective reports on the quality of public spaces rather than
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on objective outcomes. While many earlier papers also rely on subjective assessment (Luttmer,
2001; Putnam, 2007 and Dahlberg et al., 2011 among others), the extent to which our results can be
compared to those papers relying on objective outcomes (such as Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina and
La Ferrara, 2000 or Miguel and Gugerty, 2004) depends on how closely subjective measures map into
objective measures. We address this issue in several ways. First, we provide an indirect objective
measure of the quality of public housing by using the number of repairs and improvements done.
Second, we argue that objective indicators for outcomes such as violence tend to underestimate
the victimization rate, since conﬂicts are not systematically reported to oﬃcial authorities. Third,
we conduct several tests to challenge the claim that self-reported perceptions are due to personal bias.
This paper primarily contributes to the literature on the eﬀects of ethnic diversity on economic
and social outcomes. In US cities, higher ethnic diversity has been found to be associated with lower
social trust (Putnam, 2007; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002), lower welfare spending (Luttmer, 2001),
and poorer quality of public goods (Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000). In Western
Kenya, the greater the mixing of tribes, the less people have public spiritedness, and the lower the
contributions to public goods (Miguel, 2004; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005). In cross-national surveys,
diversity correlates with low growth in GDP and low quality of institutions (Easterly and Levine,
1997; Alesina et al., 2003). Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) show that islands of homogeneity amid
a broadly diverse country do not decrease the negative eﬀects of diversity on the quality of govern-
ment.2 These ﬁndings are depressing, in a normative sense, for those who herald gains from diversity
(Page, 2007); and depressing, in an empirical sense, as in our globalized world, local cultural diver-
sity is increasingly common (Dancygier, 2010). However, the robustness of the relationship and the
channels at work remain to be determined. Putnam (2007) is careful to underline that his data allow
him only to claim short run correlation between diversity and trust. Miguel (2004) ﬁnds no diversity
impacts on local outcomes in Tanzania, a country in which the ruling authorities have sought to
ameliorate ethnic cleavages by promoting a common language. Posner (2004) shows that changed
electoral rules can create broader ethnic identities thereby reducing fragmentation. Dunning and
Harrison (2010) show that inter-tribal polarization in Mali is reduced with cross-cutting cleavages.
Finally, Glennerster, Miguel and Rothenberg (2010) argue that the presence of strong chiefs at the
local level, although reinforcing the salience of ethnicity, translates into eﬀective inter-ethnic coop-
eration.
Our paper is also incidentally related to empirical works examining neighborhood eﬀects on so-
cial and economic outcomes. So far, the literature has mainly focused on the neighborhood eﬀects
on physical and mental health, economic self-suﬃciency, risky and criminal behavior, or educational
2The magnitude of the relationship between those outcomes and ethnic diversity is substantial. Putnam (2007)
ﬁnds that the diﬀerence between living in a highly homogeneous city (Bismarck, North Dakota) and the heterogeneous
Los Angeles is as great as the diﬀerence between an area with a poverty rate of 7 percent and one with a poverty rate of
23 percent. Alesina et al. (1999) show that moving from complete homogeneity to complete heterogeneity is associated
with a reduction in spending on roads by nine percentage points. Luttmer (2001) ﬁnds that interpersonal preferences
based on negative exposure and racial group loyalty of recipients are associated with 33 percent of the cross-state
variation in the support for welfare spending. Alesina et al. (2003) show that moving from perfect homogeneity to
maximum heterogeneity would be associated with a reduction in a country's growth rate by two percentage points
per year.
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outcomes (see among many others Katz et al., 2001; Oreopoulos, 2003; Goux and Maurin, 2007 and
Kling et al., 2007). In particular, Katz et al. (2001) and subsequent contributions use the Moving to
Opportunity social experiment to estimate the externalities from neighbors. To avoid the problem of
endogenous neighborhood selection, those authors use data from a randomized experiment in which
some families living in high-poverty U.S. housing projects were oﬀered housing vouchers to enable
them to move to higher income areas. While our paper is not based on a randomized experiment,
we also avoid the inferential issues of residential endogenous selection by using the exogenous spatial
allocation of households with respect to ethnic characteristics. We enlarge the dimensions analyzed
in this literature by looking at how immediate neighborhood diversity aﬀects well-being and the
quality of the local environment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data. Section 3
documents our identifying assumption on the absence of residential self-sorting in public housing.
We conduct various tests to show that the spatial allocation of households across public housing
blocks within localities is exogenous with respect to ethnic characteristics. Section 4 shows our
main results. We document the eﬀects of ethnic diversity on satisfaction, local public goods and
social relationships. We discuss the various dimensions and channels through which diversity might
matter for households' well-being at the ﬁnite local level. Section 5 provides tests of the validity
of self-reported outcomes, and we perform a series of robustness checks on our results in section 6.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Presentation of the data
2.1 Data sets
Our analysis is based on two representative French national surveys. First, we use the French Labor
Force Survey (Enquête Emploi, INSEE, hereafter the LFS) to test our identiﬁcation assumption
that spatial allocation in the public housing market can be considered to a large extent as exoge-
nous relative to ethnic characteristics. We use the continuous time version of the survey that covers
the period 2003-2007. This version provides all the relevant information about ethnic background,
economic characteristics and geographic location of individuals to test our identiﬁcation strategy.
These data are areolar: they are not drawn directly from a selection of homes, but from a selec-
tion of geographical areas (aires) made up of twenty adjacent households on average.3 Over the
2003 to 2007 period, more than 10,000 diﬀerent areas were sampled. All the households within a
randomly selected area were surveyed and, within each household, all persons aged ﬁfteen or over
were interviewed. Using these data, we can work on real neighborhoods at a very small geographic
level. Moreover, we have information on whether the respondent was living in a public housing unit,
whether he or she has been living in his or her current public housing for at least one year or whether
he or she has just moved into the neighborhood. These particular features enable us to compute the
level of ethnic diversity prevailing within each public housing block and to test for the absence of
3INSEE has chosen this sampling strategy so as to reduce the travelling expenses of those who administer the
survey.
5
self-sorting on ethnic background across public housing blocks.
Second, we use the French Housing Survey 2002 (Enquête Logement, INSEE, hereafter the HS),
to estimate the relationship between ethnic diversity and the quality of public space within the
housing block. We identify the causal eﬀect of diversity and control for self-sorting by focusing on
the public housing sector. The HS provides detailed information on the perception of the quality of
local public spaces, ranging from vandalism in the common areas, to housing quality and conﬂicts
in the neighborhood. The HS also reports detailed information about the ethnic, economic and
social backgrounds of individuals within the neighborhood.4 Yet, in this survey, the samples are not
areolar, meaning that all the individuals living in a given geographical unit are not systematically
surveyed and are randomly drawn instead. This feature implies that we have few observations within
each geographical unit of interest, the îlot. It becomes consequently diﬃcult to compute signiﬁcant
and relevant measures of diversity in one's neighborhood. We overcome this concern by using the
1999 French Population Census. Each HS sample is drawn from the most recent Census and the
geographical units of the HS are a subsample of those of the Census. As the census provides variables
such as birth country or nationality at birth, it allows us to compute representative fractionalization
indices at the îlot level and then to match them with the corresponding îlots in the HS. In this
paper, we compute fractionalization indices at the îlot level using the 1999 Population Census, and
match them to the îlots of the 2002 HS. We work at one of the smallest geographical units, the îlot,
which is comparable to a block. We will refer to "blocks" instead of îlots from now on. Table 16
in Appendix A presents descriptive statistics to provide a better idea of what constitutes a block in
the 1999 population census.
2.2 Fractionalization indexes
We rely on the ethno-linguistic fractionalization (hereafter ELF) index used in the literature (e.g.
Alesina et al., 2003) to construct our measure of ethnic diversity. This traditional measure of diversity
reﬂects the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from a given population belong to
diﬀerent groups (previous studies looked at ethno-linguistic or religious groups). More formally, the
basic fractionalization index is computed as one minus the Herﬁndahl index of ethno-linguistic group
shares:
ELF j =
i=N∑
i=1
sij (1− sij) = 1−
i=N∑
i=1
s2ij (1)
where sij is the share of group i (i=1, ..., N) in area j. If the population living in area j is fully
homogeneous, ELF j equals 0 and it converges to 1 as the population heterogeneity increases. Note
that ELF j can increase for two reasons: it will increase with the number of ethno-linguistic groups,
and it will increase the more equal the size of the groups. As mentioned above, the Census data and
the LFS provide information about the country of birth and the nationality at birth of individuals,
4Some of the key variables for our study are not public. The French Statistical Institute (INSEE) made their access
possible as part of a convention between the INSEE and Sciences Po. We were required to make use of the "sensitive"
data within the conﬁnes of the INSEE.
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allowing us to construct two diﬀerent measures of diversity. In the remainder of the paper, we focus
on diversity as measured by nationality at birth, computed at the block level. The distribution of
diversity in housing blocks is presented in Appendix A (Figure 1 and Table 17).5 Unsurprisingly,
given that immigrants and second generation French are more likely to be eligible for public housing
dwellings on income criteria than native French, the public housing neighborhoods are characterized
by higher levels of diversity than other neighborhoods.
2.3 Sample characteristics
We now document the characteristics of the 2002 Housing Survey we use in our analysis. Most
of the variables we are interested in (those describing the quality of life within one's apartment,
building or neighborhood) are given at the household level. The dataset contains 32,156 households,
corresponding to 78,791 individuals. The HS reveals that 39.6 percent of the French households are
renters while 56 percent are owners. Overall, 15.77 percent of the households live in public housing
units, representing 39.8 percent of the tenants.
Table 1 shows the main socio-demographic characteristics of our sample. We compare house-
holds living in the public and in the private housing sectors. Foreigners (or immigrants) are over-
represented in the public housing population compared to the private housing population. Public
housing neighborhoods are also characterized by a poorer socio-economic environment: the unem-
ployment rate is around twice as high as in private housing blocks. Individuals living in public
housing dwellings are less educated and earn lower incomes. Around one third of the adults have no
diploma at all, and the share of individuals having achieved graduate studies is less than half the
corresponding share in the private housing sector. Column 3 shows that the two populations are
statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent with respect to most of their characteristics. Column 4 shows the
characteristics in the private housing sector when we restrict to tenants. Still, the two populations
are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (Column 5).
Table 2 documents the perception of housing conditions by native French and immigrants in
the public housing sector. On average, natives have a much better opinion about the quality of
their housing than Maghrebians or other Africans.6 Table 2 shows that 13.8 percent of the native
French are very satisﬁed with their housing conditions while this is the case for only 8.42 percent
of the Maghrebians. Conversely, only 9.9 percent of the native French complain about insuﬃcient
housing conditions versus 18.21 percent of the Maghrebians. The last line of Table 2 reveals that
the poorer housing conditions are associated with lower levels of income, a situation more salient
for Maghrebian and African families. In particular, the households that are very satisﬁed with their
housing conditions earn on average 13,300 Euros per year, while very unsatisﬁed households earn
10,127 Euros a year on average. From the last column, we observe that the average Maghrebian
5On the public housing graph, we see that 6 percent of public housing blocks are perfectly homogeneous. This
high frequency is to a large extent explained by the fact that in many blocks we observe only very few inhabitants,
thereby increasing the chance of getting a null ELF. We keep those blocks in our main analysis, but we checked that
deleting them does not aﬀect the results.
6We observe the same pattern when we look at the various subjective and objective measures of the quality of
public housing
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family earns even less than that (8,603 Euros).
3 The exogeneity of diversity in the public housing sector
The main identiﬁcation issue raised by the estimation of the eﬀect of ethnic diversity on the quality
of public goods is that fractionalization presents a high risk of endogeneity. Individuals generally
tend to self segregate: they prefer forming links with others like themselves, with whom they share
common interests, and in particular people of the same ethnicity or the same social background.7
If people can choose the area where they live, they would rather move into neighborhoods where
people are similar to themselves. If individuals who are not constrained with respect to the location
of their home choose to gather along ethnic lines, then the richest individuals will be able to move
into the most homogeneous neighborhoods. Therefore, the level of diversity of the neighborhoods is
probably endogenous and any estimates on the implications of diversity will be biased. In particular,
if the wealthy families that live in diverse settings are those that have a taste for diversity, the true
eﬀect of diversity on social outcomes should be smaller in absolute terms.8
To identify the eﬀect of ethnic diversity, one must therefore study individuals who are assigned to
their place of residence without consideration of ethnic characteristics. The purpose of this section
is to bring evidence that spatial allocation of households across public housing blocks in France
can be considered as exogenous with respect to ethnic characteristics due to the French regulation.
Naturally, the sample of households that apply to public housing dwellings is endogenous with respect
to economic, social or cultural characteristics. But among the pool of selected households, we show
that their spatial allocation across the public housing blocks of a given department is exogenous
with respect to their ethnic characteristics.
3.1 An ethnically-blind allocation process built into law
We ﬁrst document the actual process of allocation of households across public housing dwellings. This
gives a legal basis to our identifying assumption of the absence of self-sorting on ethnic characteristics
in the public housing sector.9
We start by describing the eligibility criteria to the public housing sector. In France, the only
eligibility requirements are to be legally living in France (as a French citizen or migrant with a valid
residence permit) and to be living under a certain threshold of income per unit of consumption.
This income ceiling is usually rather high: in 2009, this threshold was between 36,748 and 50,999
Euros per year for a four-person family, depending on the region of residence (the upper ﬁgure is
nearly 3,000 Euros higher than the average disposable income of four-person households in 2007).
Using the 2002 Housing Survey data, Jacquot (2007) estimates that given their income, between two
7Race, or ethnicity, is the most salient characteristic along which homophilious relationship form.
8Combes, Decreuse, Schmutz and Trannoy (2010) use customer discrimination theory to show that owners will
tend to discriminate against ethnic minorities when renting their apartment, bringing new evidence of why any causal
claim of ethnic diversity on public goods in the private housing market would be biased.
9The process of allocation across public housing blocks in France is mainly inspired by theories from Le Corbus-
ier (1887-1965). Le Corbusier insisted that France must avoid the homogeneous ghettoes of the urban landscapes
elsewhere, and should therefore allocate housing blind to ethnicity, not permitting family networks to grow within
housing establishments. These ideas were translated into state regulation (Bernardot, 2008).
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thirds and four ﬁfths of households living in Metropolitan France could apply for a public housing
unit. As a consequence, the population eligible for public housing is about three times as large as
the available space in vacant dwellings. This implies that other criteria must be taken into account
in the distribution process. Hence, in addition to the income of the household, family situation
and household size are taken into account to ensure a suitable match with the characteristics of
vacant dwellings, as well as the emergency of the application. These are actually the main criteria
used by the commission due to the boom in housing prices in the private sector during the mid-
90s and the 2000s. In particular, ﬁve priority criteria are deﬁned by law (Article L441-1 of law
relative to construction and housing - Code pour la Construction et l'Habitat) at the national level
to ensure that vacant housing will ﬁrst be distributed to households with obvious social diﬃculties.
Households satisfying these priority criteria are those in which there is a (mentally or physically)
disabled person, those living in precarious or hazardous shelter due to ﬁnancial constraints, those
living in a temporary accommodation, individuals living in a precarious shelter who recently found
a job after a long unemployment spell, and spouse-abused individuals.
To get on the queue for a housing unit, households submit a form revealing their identity and
family situation, their employment status and the resources of the household, the reasons for ap-
plying to the public housing sector (currently or soon to be homeless, or reasons related to health
situation, family situation, job situation, inappropriate current housing, unpleasant environment),
the type of housing looked for, whether the applicant is disabled and whether this is the ﬁrst appli-
cation. It is important to stress the fact that the application form contains very limited information
about the ethnicity of the applicant: he or she only needs to inform about his or her nationality,
which is limited to three possible categories (French, European Union, or non European Union).
We now document the selection process of the applicants. The commissions of selection in charge
of allocating households to vacant public housing dwellings are held at the department level (or at
the city level in the case of Paris which is both a city and a department due to its size).10 The
composition of the commissions is regulated by law: it includes six members of the public housing
oﬃces board, a representative of associations for integration (appointed by the head of the depart-
ment -préfet), mayors of the cities (or districts) in which vacant housings are to be attributed, as
well as a representative of any association defending tenant rights. In addition, another department
representative may attend the commission. For each vacant housing unit, at least three households
must be considered by the commissioners, who ﬁnally decide which household will be allocated to
which housing unit, according to the eligibility and priority criteria detailed above. Other criteria
such as the number of children in the household are also taken into account in order to allocate
suitable dwellings.11
10Metropolitan France is divided into 22 large administrative areas, called régions (regions henceforth), and into 96
smaller administrative areas, called départements (departments henceforth). Each department is hence a subdivision
of a region, and several departments can belong to the same region. Each department is administered by an elected
General Council (Conseil Général) and its President, whose main areas of responsibility include the management of
a number of social and welfare programs, junior high schools (collèges), buildings and technical staﬀ, local roads,
schools, rural buses, and municipal infrastructure.
11Public housing allocation in Paris serves as a useful concrete example. We draw on the oﬃcial audit of Observatoire
du Logement et de l'Habitat de Paris (2011). Paris is a special case as it is, due to its size, a department as well as a
city. The application form, the commission, and the allocation process thus take place in Paris, at the city level. As
9
With the allocation process regulated by legal rules at the national level, it seems unlikely that
households can be allocated according to their origin. The main concern of the commissions is to
favor socially endangered households, as shown by the priority criteria. Finally and most impor-
tantly perhaps, any decision based on the origin of an applicant, i.e. discriminating on this basis, is
prohibited in France. Public housing oﬃces are also regularly audited. If evidence of discrimination
is detected, they are judged and punished accordingly. This is why the lawyers Rouquette and Lip-
ietz (1991) stress that the rules of allocation of public housing units that prohibit "localism", and
the high administrative barriers that eﬀectively prohibit exchanges of lodgings except for changing
spatial needs of families, make the allocation of public housing units largely exogenous with respect
to the ethnic origins of the applicants.
Despite this legal process of allocation, one might still be worried about the possibility of self-
sorting of households that refuse the residential allocation proposed by the commission. In theory,
households can refuse up to three oﬀers. However, self-sorting, especially on ethnic characteristics,
seems unlikely to be a common practice. Residential mobility within the HLM sector is very low, due
to the current strong shortage of supply of public housing dwellings. This makes it unlikely that the
selected households could be really picky about the diversity of their neighborhood (see the study
by Simon, 2003). In addition, rents are considerably lower in public housing than in private housing,
increasing the opportunity cost of moving, so that the turnover is very low. More speciﬁcally, the
mobility rate in the public housing sector is even lower than for recent owners. Using data from
the 2002 Housing Survey, Debrand and Taﬃn (2005) give precise measures of the mobility rate: it
amounts to 10.3 percent for new owners, to 15.9 percent for tenants in the private housing sector,
but only to 9.9 percent for tenants in the public housing sector. While even 9.9 percent may seem
high, we show in section 3.2.2 that when households move, they almost never achieve a placement
in a less diverse setting in the public sector. Besides, the mobility rates seem to have become even
lower in recent years due to the boom of prices in the private sector, as shown in the Parisian case
in footnote 11. The authors also document an increase in the gap in the mobility rates between
the private and the public rental markets: there is was 6 point diﬀerence in 2002, to be compared
to a 0.8 point diﬀerence in 1984. As a consequence of the size of the eligible population and of
the low turnover, the waiting periods are rather long: the 2002 Housing Survey documents that
of January 2010, there were 186,017 public housing dwellings in Paris. Public housing buildings are scattered across
all Parisian areas, with a high concentration (69 percent) in six districts (the 13th, 14th, 15th, 18th, 19th and 20th
arrondissements). Within Paris, 48.7 percent of households are under the income ceiling and could be theoretically
eligible. In practice, only households with very modest incomes apply (71 percent have an income lower than the
minimum ceiling for all France, equivalent to 2,345 euros per month for a household with two children). On the 31st
of December 2010, there were 121,937 ongoing applications, to be compared to 12,500 public housing units allocated
over the year 2010. The breakdown of the population that were granted a public housing unit in 2010 is the following.
67.7 percent came from precarious housing, 28.8 percent came from the private rental sector, and 2.3 percent came
from the public housing sector. In the latter case, those are people who moved for larger space following an increase
in their household size (only 12 percent of the public housing dwellings have more than three rooms). The mobility
rate (deﬁned as the ratio of new entrants over the total number of public housing dwellings) is particularly low: it
reaches 5.5 percent in 2010. It is formally possible to indicate a precise neighborhood in the application form, but
in practice, very few applicants (6.6 percent) do provide this information. More than half of the 121,937 applicants
(52.9 percent) did not mention any particular area at all, probably due to the fear of being rejected on this ground.
Among those who indicated an area of preference, 91.2 percent mentioned the area where they were already living.
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over one third of the population applying for a public housing unit had been waiting for more than
one year. A closer look at the distribution of waiting periods reveals a diﬀerence between natives
and immigrants, but this diﬀerence is washed out once we control for household characteristics: the
main determinant of a longer waiting period is household size. This is not surprising, as the public
housing market in France is characterized by a shortage of large apartments. This is part of the
explanation of the diﬀerence in waiting period between immigrants and native French, as the former
tend to have more children than the latter, on average.
In a word, the public housing market is very tight, and highly regulated. This implies that
households have very limited control over the time when they will be assigned a HLM dwelling and
the precise place where it will be located. This is especially true at the block level, which is our level
of analysis. This gives some initial support to our assumption that the distribution of households
across public housing blocks is blind to ethnic characteristics and preferences of households.
3.2 Tests on the exogeneity of spatial allocation of households in public housings
In the remainder of this section, we provide more formal tests lending further conﬁdence that the
spatial allocation of households across public housing blocks of given localities is exogenous with
respect to ethnic variables. We carry out a variety of formal tests to show that the absence of
self-sorting on ethnic characteristics is veriﬁed on statistical grounds.12
3.2.1 Absence of self-sorting on ethnic backgrounds
Our ﬁrst set of tests consists in showing that while households tend to self-segregate in the uncon-
strained private housing market, there is no such evidence in the public housing market. We test
this using the LFS and focusing on individuals who recently moved into an area (within the previous
year).
We ﬁrst estimate the correlation between the hourly wages of the movers and the level of diversity
of the area into which they just moved. Without prior beliefs over agents' preferences, if individuals
have a taste for or against homogeneity, there should be a signiﬁcant relationship between the level of
ethnic diversity prevailing in their neighborhood and their wages when their choice is not constrained
by legal rules. Indeed, in an unconstrained market (e.g. the private housing market), the richer the
individual, the easier it should be for him or her to choose his or her neighborhood. Therefore,
if the level of diversity of the area enters one's preferences, there should be a correlation between
individual wealth and the level of diversity in the area. In the public housing market as well, some
public housing units are more expensive than others, depending on the location and the date of
12Algan et al. (2011) conduct an alternative test of the exogenous allocation of households in the public housing
sector. They regress households ethnic characteristics on ﬁxed eﬀects associated with the diﬀerent public housings
within each department. The test for exogeneity of diversity consists in performing standard F-test on the null
hypothesis that the ﬁxed eﬀects are jointly not statistically diﬀerent from zero. In the case of endogenous residential
sorting in some public housings, the ﬁxed eﬀects associated with those blocks should be statistically signiﬁcantly
correlated with the household characteristics, and the F-test will be rejected. They ﬁnd that in more than 85 percent
of the departments the F-test reject the null-hypothesis of a correlation between ethnic characteristics of the households
and the public housing ﬁxed eﬀects.
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construction. The wealthiest inhabitants could thus have some control over the diversity of their
neighborhood, in theory.
To test this, we compute the fractionalization index of the area to which a household recently
moved taking into account only the neighbors who had been living there for more than one year.
We thus calculate the fractionalization indices at stake prior to the move. For the private housing
market, we compute the fractionalization index of the whole area, including both the population
living in private and public housing dwellings within this area. We follow this strategy since there
are a few areas with both public and private housing units in the LFS. It is reasonable to think that
it is the level of diversity of the whole neighborhood that will matter in the mobility decision in the
private market.13 Regarding the public housing sector, we compute the level of diversity including
residents of the public housing only, our identiﬁcation assumption being that households do not have
control over the level of diversity of their neighborhood within the public housing sector.
We run OLS estimates of the hourly wage of newly arrived individuals on the level of diver-
sity of the area in which they just moved, controlling for the department of residence.14 First, we
focus on individuals having just moved into a private dwelling. We ﬁnd a very strong negative
relationship between income and diversity (the estimated coeﬃcient is -0.14 and is signiﬁcant at the
1 percent level).15 Then we look at the sample of individuals having moved into a public housing
dwelling within the past year. In this case, the simple OLS regression reveals that there is no sig-
niﬁcant correlation between the income of individuals moving into a public housing dwelling and
pre-existing diversity of nationalities within the neighborhood.16 These correlations show that while
the wealthiest households tend to self-segregate in less diverse areas in the (unregulated) private
housing market, it does not seem to be the case in the (regulated) public housing market. In other
words, although diversity enters households' preferences as revealed by the private housing market
result, the location in the public housing market seems to be unaﬀected by such preferences.
Our second test uses the same methodology and estimates the link between the nationality of
individuals moving into a new area and the share of the area's "long term" population of the same
nationality.17 We expect a signiﬁcant relationship in the private housing market where location
choice is relatively unconstrained but not in the public housing sector. Table 3 reports the results
from an OLS regression of individuals' origin (measured by nationality)18 on the share of the popu-
lation of his or her new neighborhood from each nationality, controlling for individual characteristics
(quadratic function of age, gender, log of hourly wage, education, socio-professional category) and
including department ﬁxed eﬀects. The coeﬃcients reported in Table 3 are those associated with
13The results are unchanged if we consider only the population living in the private housing sector: the magnitude
of the correlation decreases marginally, but remains statistically signiﬁcant.
14If we reverse the dependent and the explanatory variables, the sign and signiﬁcance level of the coeﬃcient remains
the same.
15This is powerful evidence of the bias introduced with endogenous sorting
16The results are not displayed but are available upon request.
17A similar test was proposed by Goux and Maurin (2007) to show that the educational achievement of the children
of newcomers in public housing is uncorrelated with that of the current residents. Individuals do not self-select in
public housing neighborhoods according to the educational achievement of the neighbors' children. By contrast, the
authors ﬁnd a strong self-selection on the educational characteristics in the private housing sector.
18We also performed the same test using the country of birth instead of the nationality, and we also tried alternative
origin groups. The results remain qualitatively similar with these various speciﬁcations, and are available upon request.
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the share of the area's population of the same origin as the individual.
In the private housing sector (Column 1), a signiﬁcant relationship between one's nationality
and the share of same-origin neighbors shows up for most of the nationality groups. By contrast,
in the public housing sector (Column 2), there is no statistically signiﬁcant relationship between
the nationality of the individual and the share of the "long term" population in the area having
the same nationality. The standard errors are quite large in the public housing sector due to a low
number of observations, but the correlation is close to zero for households with African origins, and
is around three times as low as in the private sector for households with Maghrebian origin. The
only signiﬁcant relationship shows up for immigrants from Europe, but they represent a marginal
share of the whole immigrant population compared to immigrants from the Maghreb and Africa.
We conduct the same kind of test on other individual characteristics, and reach similar con-
clusions. We ﬁnd that in the private sector, highly educated (respectively low skilled) individuals
are very likely to move into neighborhoods with higher levels of highly educated (respectively low
skilled) people. This is not surprising and illustrates self segregation along education level in the
private sector. On the contrary, such segregation does not appear in the public housing sector. The
only characteristic for which we ﬁnd a positive correlation between the new and the old inhabitants
in public housing blocks is the fact of being a factory worker. This is perhaps not too surprising
either given that factory workers represent more than 30 percent of the public housing population,
and due to the history of public housing, which was initially (and over several decades) dedicated
to factory workers.
Finally, we also regress the probability of having moved in a new HLM dwelling in the past year
(dummy equal to one in this case and to zero if the individual was already living in the same HLM
apartment one year before) on individual characteristics (nationality, age, gender, wage, education,
socio professional group), and the interaction of these characteristics with the ethnic diversity among
the public housing population of the block.19 As would be expected in the absence of sorting, the
coeﬃcients on the interaction terms are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The only exception
is for the interaction of ELF with the dummy for African nationality, for which the coeﬃcient is
negative and signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
3.2.2 Tests on the refusal rate of public housing oﬀers
The previous tests point out the absence of self-selection along ethnic lines among the movers. But
self-selection could occur prior to the move. In this case the sample of movers that we observe in the
database would be biased. We address this issue by looking at households that have refused a public
housing dwelling oﬀer. Actually, a disturbing fact for our assumption is that a non-negligible share
of households waiting to be allocated into a public housing unit report to have declined at least one
oﬀer. In the Housing Survey, 24.2 percent of households currently living in a public housing dwelling
report to have rejected at least one proposal before ﬁnding their current place. Besides, 16.5 percent
of the households that are still waiting for an oﬀer at the time of the survey - whether they are
already living in a public housing dwelling or not- have previously turned down at least one oﬀer.
19The results are not displayed in the paper but are available from authors upon request.
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An additional concern is that 47.9 percent of the households in public housing that had declined an
oﬀer at the time they were on the waiting list declared that one of the major reasons for this decision
was they found the local environment unpleasant.20 The corresponding ﬁgure for the households
still waiting for an answer amounts to 57 percent. The answer "unpleasant local environment" is
hard to interpret at this stage, since it could refer to diversity as well as the proximity to public
transport and infrastructure, lack of green spaces and so on.
Yet, we show that even if households declined at least one oﬀer, possibly due to the ethnic di-
versity of the neighborhood, they were still unable to choose the level of diversity of the area in
wich they end up living, and would not be able to do so for any neighborhood to which they would
receive an allocation in the future. To put it another way, although households may have a distaste
for diversity, we ﬁnd evidence that this is not taken into account in their allocation process by the
attribution commissions. In principle, households can decline up to three oﬀers. But due to the
strong shortage of public housing dwellings, we ﬁnd that households that have declined an oﬀer in
the past cannot self-select into less diverse neighborhoods in the future. We provide evidence of that
fact in what follows.
First, if there were self-selection upon diversity, we should expect households that turned down
proposals before being allocated to their current public housing dwelling to end up living in less
diverse neighborhoods. To test this conjecture, we run OLS regressions of a variable indicating
whether the household declined at least one oﬀer (during the latest application process) on the level
of diversity of the neighborhood in which it now lives.21 Panel A-I of Table 4 shows various estimates
of the eﬀect of ethnic diversity on the probability of having turned down oﬀers. Column 1 shows
the correlation without any additional control variables. In Column 2, we control for household
characteristics. We add up the characteristics of the housing project in Column 3. Column 4 ﬁnally
includes neighborhood characteristics and department ﬁxed eﬀects since the allocation of a public
housing dwelling takes place at the department level. In each speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient on ELF
is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, showing that households having declined oﬀers during their
past allocation process do not end up living in neighborhoods with signiﬁcantly diﬀerent levels of
diversity.
We explore further the validity of this conjecture by focusing on the reasons adumbrated by
households for refusing an oﬀer. If public housing residents were to sort themselves on the basis of
their (dis)taste for diversity, those who declined "because of the local environment" should now live
in signiﬁcantly less diverse neighborhoods. We thus regress a dummy variable indicating whether an
"unpleasant environment" was the reason why the household declined at least one oﬀer (during the
past application process) on the level of diversity of its current neighborhood. Panel A-II of Table
4 reports the estimates on the level of diversity, using the same speciﬁcations as above. Here again,
none of the coeﬃcients is signiﬁcant. Instead, household characteristics such as the labor market
status of the head of household and the size of the household are the only ones that matter in these
20The other possible answers were: inconvenient place, rent too expensive, low quality building, and apartment not
corresponding to household needs.
21In this paper, we always rely on OLS estimations, even when the dependent variables are dummies. Using probit
estimates does signiﬁcantly aﬀect our results.
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regressions.
Alternatively, we perform these tests on the subsample of individuals currently waiting for an
HLM oﬀer. Panel B of Table 4 shows the regressions of the refusal dummy (B-I) and the "refusal
due to unpleasant environment" dummy (B-II), for individuals who are currently applying for public
housing on the diversity in their neighborhood. We still control for household, building and neigh-
borhood characteristics. Once again, we ﬁnd that the ethnic diversity of a block is uncorrelated
with households wait-listed for an HLM assignment having turned down oﬀers since the beginning
of their request (B-I). This suggests that the current level of diversity in the block does not rush
households out of the area, as their propensity to decline an oﬀer is independent of the ELF in the
current neighborhood. The high refusal rates of HLM oﬀers do not therefore seem driven by a hope
to reduce diversity by waiting.
Let us now focus on individuals who left their previous housing unit because they did not like the
environment. In the Housing Survey, 5 percent of households that moved over the past four years
mention an unpleasant environment as one of the main reason they moved. In this question, the
phrase "unpleasant environment" explicitly refers to troubles such as "noise, lifestyle or insecurity".
Again, this could be related to high levels of diversity. If this is true, and if households can actually
select the block to which they move, then we expect that those households having moved because
they disliked their environment ended up living in less diverse neighborhoods than the households
that moved for a diﬀerent reason.
We perform OLS regressions of a variable indicating whether the household left its previous
housing due to an unpleasant environment, on the level of diversity of its current neighborhood.
Table 5 shows the coeﬃcients on diversity in the speciﬁcation controlling for household, building
and neighborhood characteristics, and including department ﬁxed eﬀects. Column 1 shows the
results for households that moved within the private housing market. As expected, households that
left their previous housing to escape from an unpleasant environment now live in blocks where the
diversity is signiﬁcantly lower. Column 2 shows that this result does not hold for households that
moved within the public housing market. This result suggests once again that in the public housing
sector, households do not have control over the diversity of the block to which they are allocated.
A potential concern with the previous result is due to the small sample of observations (only 627
in the public housing case), generating large standard errors. Therefore, we replicate this test on a
larger subsample. Instead of focusing on households that have moved within a housing sector, we
now concentrate on households having moved into each sector, no matter the sector in which they
were living prior to their move.22 As previously, we see that for households living in the private
housing sector, the probability that they left their previous housing due to an unpleasant environ-
ment is negatively correlated with the diversity in the current neighborhood (Column 3). However,
no such signiﬁcant relationship shows up for households living in a public housing dwelling (Column
4), and the estimates are now more precise than in Column 2. We can infer from those tests that
households tend to self-select in low-diversity neighborhoods in the private housing sector, but are
22To summarize, Columns 1 and 2 report the results for households moving from a housing dwelling in the private (1)
and public (2) sectors into a housing dwelling in the same sectors. Columns 3 and 4 report the results for households
moving from any housing sector into the private (3) and public (4) sectors.
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unable to do so in the public housing sector.
3.3 Test on the distribution of ethnic groups shares across public housing blocks
We conclude this section with a test on the distribution of ethnic groups shares across public hous-
ing blocks within each department. As mentioned in section 3.1, the allocation of households across
public housing blocks takes place at the department level. If the members of the commission follow
the legal criteria and do not take into account the ethnic characteristics in the allocation process,
we should ﬁnd an equal distribution of households of a given nationality across the various public
housing blocks within each department. For the sake of illustration, let us assume that 10 percent
of Maghrebians live in the public housing sector in Paris. We should ﬁnd the same share of 10
percent of Maghrebians within each Parisian housing block if the allocation was truly exogenous
with respect to ethnic characteristics. Naturally, this equality of distribution of ethnic groups shares
across housing blocks can hold only if we have a suﬃciently large number of individuals within each
housing block. Instead, in the 1999 Population Census database, we only observe an average of 18.4
diﬀerent individuals out of the whole population living in each block (same average in the Labor
Force Survey). This is due to the sampling strategy of the French National Institute of Statistics and
Economics (INSEE) that interviews only a subsample of adjacent households from the overall block.
With such a small sample size of observations at the block level, any analytical test of equality of
distribution of ethnic groups shares across blocks would fail. We thus use Monte Carlo simulation
to reproduce an artiﬁcially random distribution of the population. We randomly reallocate the pub-
lic housing population across the diﬀerent blocks within each department, and then compare this
random distribution to the actual distribution.
Let us now describe more precisely this last test. Using the 1999 Census data, we pool the public
housing population from each department, and reallocate it randomly across the diﬀerent public
housing blocks of the corresponding department, taking into account the demographic structure of
each neighborhood. In order to avoid composition eﬀects due to existing families, we also restrict our
sample to household heads. We also restrict our sample to the neighborhoods where we observe at
least ﬁve percent of Maghrebians to focus on areas where we have suﬃcient observations to perform
this test. After simulating a random distribution of ethnic groups shares as explained above, we
compare the actual and the simulated distributions of native French and Maghrebians shares across
neighborhoods. We ﬁrst run a simple t-test of equality of means. Then we conduct a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, which is a more demanding test of equality of distributions.
Table 6 reports the percentage of departments for which the actual and simulated distributions
of ethnic shares across neighborhoods are similar, i.e. those for which we cannot reject the null
hypothesis at the 10% level. The labels in the ﬁrst column indicate the ethnic group for which we
compare the distributions of the shares across neighborhoods. The second column shows that there
is no department for which we can reject the null hypothesis that the real and simulated distributions
of the ethnic group shares have equal means. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results are displayed
in the third column. According to this test, the actual and simulated distributions of native French
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shares across HLM neighborhoods are similar in 98.61 percent of the departments. When we focus
on Maghrebians shares, we ﬁnd that the two distributions are alike in 98 percent of departments as
well. All in all, those tests are in line with the idea that the distribution of the households eligible
for public housing across the housing blocks can be considered as exogenous with respect to ethnic
characteristics.
4 Results
4.1 Speciﬁcation
This section estimates the impact of diversity on the quality of local public goods and social rela-
tionships. We identify the eﬀect of diversity by using data from the public housing sector where
households are exogenously allocated with respect to ethnic characteristics. Let j, k and l indicate
respectively households, buildings and blocks. For each outcome, we estimate the following equation:
Yjkl = α+ βELFl + γXj + δZk + µWl + εjkl (2)
where Yjkl denotes the housing outcome we are interested in, as stated by household j in building
k and block l, ELFl is the level of ethnic diversity in the block, Xj is a vector of household char-
acteristics, Zk a vector of building characteristics and Wl a vector of socio-economic characteristics
of the block. We also control for department ﬁxed eﬀects since the spatial allocation of households
across public housings is decided at the department level. All results derive from OLS estimates,
with robust standard errors clustered at the block level.23
The regressions presented in this section control for a large set of household characteristics: age,
gender, level of education, labor market status and nationality24 of the household head, as well as
household size, and total household income per member. In addition, we can also control for building
characteristics, such as the number of apartments in the housing project (in log), and its date of
construction. Indeed, the size and the number of occupants might aﬀect the ability of the households
to coordinate for improving the commons or to enforce norms, while the age of the building might
explain part of the degradations observed and tenant satisfaction.
An important issue in our regressions is whether the degree of fractionalization is picking up
various dimensions of the environment where people are living, including the extent of inequality
and the unemployment rate or the socio-economic background of the neighborhood (Alesina and
La Ferrara, 2002). We therefore include a very detailed classiﬁcation in 27 categories of the socio-
economic environment of each neighborhood, constructed by Nicole Tabard (2002) from the INSEE.
This classiﬁcation characterizes each area according to the labor market status, the socio-professional
category and the occupation of all the men in the area. We use the classiﬁcation that was built using
the 1999 census data. This variable is the most detailed one available in French national surveys
23We have also run logistic regressions on dummy outcomes, with similar results. To ease the interpretation of the
coeﬃcients, we will report the OLS estimates henceforth.
24We distinguish between the following categories for nationalities: French at birth, naturalized French, from other
European countries, Maghrebian, Sub-Saharan African, Asian and all others.
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to capture the socio-economic background of an area. We also include the unemployment rate
computed at the block level using the 1999 Population Census data. Finally, we include department
ﬁxed eﬀects, as speciﬁed above.
4.2 The eﬀect of fractionalization on the opinion on housing conditions
Let us ﬁrst examine the impact of diversity on the general satisfaction about housing conditions.
From the HS, we use the question: "In general how do you judge the quality of your housing
conditions?". The variable takes on values from 1, for very good, to 5 for very bad. Over the public
housing population, the average of this variable is of 2.5, with a 0.98 standard deviation. This
question on well-being related to housing conditions is rather general. We will detail the diﬀerent
dimensions that could aﬀect this well-being in the following subsection.
Table 7 looks at the role of ethnic diversity on the satisfaction about housing conditions in
the public housing sector. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation (Column 1), we only control for household
characteristics: gender, age, level of education, employment status and nationality of the head of
household, along with the household size and its income (in log). Ethnic diversity is thus the
only variable capturing a block level characteristic. The coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at
the one percent level. Column 2 reports the estimates obtained when including controls for the
building characteristics (number of apartments (in log) and date of construction). In Column 3,
we also control for potentially confounding factors with ethnic diversity at the block level, namely
the unemployment rate and the socio-economic background of the neighborhood (as given by the
Tabard index). In this third speciﬁcation, we include department ﬁxed eﬀects as well. As this is the
most comprehensive speciﬁcation, we will henceforth refer to it as our preferred speciﬁcation.
In the ﬁrst two speciﬁcations, the estimated eﬀect of ethnic diversity is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1 percent level, while it is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level in our preferred speciﬁcation.
According to this speciﬁcation (Column 3), a one standard deviation increase in ethnic diversity
generates an increase in the dissatisfaction with housing conditions that amounts to 6.7 percent
of its standard deviation. To get a better sense of the magnitude of this eﬀect, we can say that
the increase in the dissatisfaction with housing conditions generated by a one standard deviation
increase in block unemployment rate corresponds to 13.1 percent of its standard deviation. Thus the
eﬀect of diversity on satisfaction is as sizeable as half the eﬀect of the local unemployment rate. Two
other variables seem to be related to household satisfaction with housing conditions: members of
larger households tend to be less satisﬁed with their housing condition, while those living in newer
buildings (constructed after 1990) have a signiﬁcantly better opinion on the subject than others.
Finally, older and more educated individuals also complain less than others, but to a lesser extent.25
25The results reported in 7 also show that people of Asian nationalities tend to be more satisﬁed with their housing
condition than native French. However, we do not give much credit to this ﬁgure given that we observe only 9 Asian
individuals in the public housing sector in our dataset.
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4.3 The various eﬀects of diversity
4.3.1 Vandalism, Housing quality and Civil conﬂict
This section looks further at the various dimensions of the dissatisfaction with housing conditions
that could be aﬀected by ethnic fractionalization. The HS covers a large variety of questions on
the quality of the housing environment. Table 8 reports descriptive statistics of the outcomes we
look at. To organize the discussion about those questions, we distinguish three main dimensions:
(a) voluntary degradations or vandalism, (b) poor quality of housing that is likely to be due to
a lack of maintenance and repairs and (c) personal aggression and robberies to which we refer as
civil conﬂicts. We have also run an exploratory factor analysis that yields similar, if not identical,
categories. Appendix B reports the results obtained with the three indices resulting from the factor
analysis.
The ﬁrst dimension of housing quality refers to degradations of the common areas due to vol-
untary neglect. In this category, we include all the variables reporting deterioration in the common
areas of the building. First, households are asked a general question on degradations: "Were the
common areas of your building (lobby, staircase, ﬂoors) vandalized or neglected (destruction, deteri-
oration) over the last twelve months?". The answers are 1 for "Never", 2 for "Minor degradations"
and 3 for "Major or very frequent degradations". Households are then asked to mention which kind
of degradations they observed over the previous year. They can choose several possible answers
from the following list: graﬃti or degradations of the walls (or on the ﬂoor), trash and litter on the
ﬂoor, broken windows, broken doors, broken light bulbs, degradation of mail boxes, degradation of the
entry phone or entry code, deterioration of the elevator. For each outcome, the variable is coded as
1 in case of a degradation, and 0 otherwise. All those items refer more or less directly to a willful
degradation. We will thus refer to this set of questions as the category Vandalism. We also include
in this category a question about noise pollution:26 "How frequently are you disturbed by the noise in
your housing during the day?", "During the night?". The answers are 1 for "Infrequently or never",
2 for "Rather frequently", and 3 for "Very frequently".
The second category we consider refers to goods that are not directly produced or altered by
residents. But they might be related to diversity by the lack of maintenance and repairs by the
HLM oﬃce to improve the housing quality. We will henceforth label this category Poor Quality of
Housing. We include in this category variables corresponding to housing problems that can neither
be caused nor solved by the tenants, but for which HLM oﬃces are responsible. The households
are ﬁrst asked: "How would you qualify the way the common areas of your building are maintained
and taken care of (cleaning, maintenance of collective facilities: lighting, trash cans,...)?". The
answer ranges from 1 for good, to 2 for average, and 3 for bad. More speciﬁc questions are also
asked: "How does the façade of your building look?",27 "What is the quality of the soundprooﬁng
of your housing?",28 "Was the elevator out of order during more than 24 hours over the past three
26The underlying assumption is that the source of the noise in the hallways and apartments of the building is not
due to poor soundprooﬁng.
27There are ﬁve possible answers: 1=As new, 2=Good, 3=Average, 4=Dirty, 5= Bad, with cracks, 6=Very bad,
the building threatens to collapse.
28The possible answers are: 1=Good, 2=Average, 3=Bad.
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months?",29 "Did you experience toilet issues (leaks, ﬂush breakdown, drainage problem) over the
last three months?", or "Did you experience coldness in your apartment during more than 24 hours
over the past twelve months?". We also include more detailed questions concerning the origin of
coldness: "Did you experience coldness because of a bad insulation?", "Did you experience coldness
because the heating equipment broke down ?" and "Did you experience coldness because of a poor
heating equipment?". For all the previous questions, the variable is 1 when the answer is "Yes" and
0 otherwise.
The last category of questions refers to personal aggressions and criminality. We will label this
category Civil Conﬂicts. Three questions correspond to this category: "Have you, or a member of
your household, been a victim of or a witness to physical aggression in your neighborhood during
the last twelve months?", "Have you, or a member of your household, been a victim of or a witness
to a robbery in your neighborhood during the last twelve months?", and "Have you been victim of
a burglary (or any attempt) over the past twelve months?". For these three questions, the variable
equals 1 in case of the event, and zero otherwise.
4.3.2 Results
Table 9 shows the eﬀect of ethnic fractionalization on the various outcomes corresponding to the three
diﬀerent dimensions: "Vandalism", "Quality of housing" and "Civil conﬂict".30 For each outcome,
we run three separate regressions according to equation 2, using various sets of control variables, as
speciﬁed at the bottom of each column. More precisely, in Column 1, we report the results when
we only control for households characteristics. In addition, we control for building characteristics in
the regressions reported in Column 2. We control for these variables as they may explain a large
part of the degradations observed in the housing projects. Finally, in Column 3 we report the es-
timates obtained when we also control for neighborhood characteristics and department ﬁxed eﬀects.
The ﬁrst panel of Table 9 reports the eﬀect of ethnic diversity on outcomes related to voluntary
degradations and vandalism. We report the results in the public housing environment, with various
sets of controls as detailed above. For all the outcomes considered, the estimated eﬀect of ethnic
diversity is always statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level,31 and is sizeable. Let us for instance
look at the results for graﬃti in the full-speciﬁcation (Column 3): a one standard deviation increase
in ethnic diversity is associated with a rise by 5.6 percentage points in the probability of observing
graﬃti, which represents 12.8 percent of the total standard deviation of this outcome. The eﬀect
of ethnic diversity is comparable to the eﬀect of local unemployment: a one standard deviation
increase in block unemployment rate is associated with a rise by 4.56 percentage in the probability
of observing graﬃti. Regarding the deterioration of elevators, a one standard deviation increase in
ethnic diversity induces a 4.9 percentage points increase in the probability of observing degradation
29On the contrary, the question mentioned in the Vandalism section refers to deterioration in the elevator rather
than mechanical breakdown.
30The coeﬃcient estimates for the control variables are not reported here but are very similar to those reported in
Table 7 and are available upon request.
31The exception is for the indicator for broken doors and noise during the day, for which the eﬀect of diversity is
only signiﬁcant at the 5% level in the full-speciﬁcation (Column 3).
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of the elevator, which represents 16.7 percent of the total standard deviation of this outcome. This
eﬀect is once again as sizeable as that of the local unemployment rate. Note also that the size of
the building (i.e. the number of housings) has a strong positive impact on all the outcomes related
to vandalism.
The second set of regressions in Table 9 shows the eﬀect of diversity on the index on outcomes
signaling poor quality of housing. The coeﬃcient associated with ethnic diversity is not always sig-
niﬁcant, especially in the full-speciﬁcation. However, more diverse neighborhood are characterized
by a lower care of the commons by the persons in charge, a poorer condition of the façade, more
frequent concerns with heating, more frequent elevator breakdowns and toilet issues. It is worth
noting that the estimated eﬀects of diversity are much lower than those found for outcomes associ-
ated with vandalism. Consider the outcome associated with the probability that the elevator is out
of order. In the full speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd that when the ELF increases by one standard deviation,
the probability that the elevator was out of order during at least 24 hours over the last three months
rises by 1.9 percentage points. This corresponds to only 5.24% of the standard deviation of this out-
come. If we now turn to heating issues, our results indicate that a one standard deviation increase
in ethnic diversity is associated with a rise by 2.43 percentage points in the probability to have
experienced insuﬃcient heat in the apartment during more than 24 hours over the past year, which
represents 6.41 percent of the total standard deviation of this outcome. The date of construction of
the building is also an important explanatory variable for most of the outcomes related to general
housing quality, as it accounts for the general state of capital equipment under the responsibility of
the HLM oﬃce (heating, façade, soundprooﬁng,...).32 The fact of living in a building constructed
after 1982 decreases signiﬁcantly the probability of reporting that housing quality is poor.
The last panel of Table 9 reports the results for outcomes related to civil conﬂict, capturing
direct aggression, robberies and burglaries. Remarkably, it shows that ethnic diversity does not have
a signiﬁcant impact on any of these outcome variables in our preferred speciﬁcation. This ﬁnding
is consistent with Fearon and Laitin (1996), who argue that despite inter-ethnic relations being
generally more tense, in-group policing mechanisms typically keep violence oﬀ of the equilibrium
path.
In sum, and taking advantage of data at a more micro level than has heretofore been available,
we see that fractionalization operates with diﬀerent degrees of impact for diﬀerent sorts of public
goods.33 To be sure, results were not signiﬁcant for all of the outcomes that we examine. But
overall, the results are clear that fractionalization at the local level increases vandalism by a great
deal, decreases building maintenance by a moderate (but overall signiﬁcant) degree, and has no eﬀect
on security. These ﬁndings allow us (as we do in the next section) to propose the various channels
through which fractionalization works in the provision of public goods.
32When we run the full speciﬁcation regression without taking this variable into account, the coeﬃcients on diversity
are generally higher. For instance, it is twice as large in the regression of elevator breakdowns.
33Our ﬁndings are unchanged with regressions on aggregated indices obtained with a principal component analysis
(see Appendix B), and with a mean eﬀect analysis (see Appendix C).
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4.3.3 Rationalization of the channels
To rationalize our ﬁndings, we propose diﬀerent interpretations of the channels through which frac-
tionalization aﬀects local public goods. The category "Vandalism" refers to voluntary degradations
of the common areas of the building, such as damaging common property, graﬃti, or depositing
trash on the ﬂoor. These are outcomes over which public housing residents have control and for
which they can be held responsible.34 The category "Quality of housing" include variables such as
the condition of the outside walls, quality of soundprooﬁng or coldness in the apartment. Those
variables are more the responsibility of the public housing managers. Finally, the "Civil conﬂict"
category represents outcomes that are less under the control of local authorities than of the state
police. We ﬁnd that both locally controlled outcomes are negatively aﬀected by diversity, and we
provide a diﬀerent rationalization of the channels for each type.
Our interpretation for the results on "Vandalism" is that diversity prevents the creation of social
norms to punish defectors, as the threat of social sanctions is lower across groups. This has been a
standard result in the literature since the seminal work of Coleman (1988), and it helps explain why
we observe more voluntary degradations with diversity. Supporting our intuition, many households
living in the public housing sector report having "no relationship at all" with their neighbors. In
addition, the more diverse the neighborhood, the more likely individuals are to report having bad re-
lationship with their neighbors, which can be a barrier to the creation of social norms. Alternatively,
homogeneity might induce higher levels of other-regardedness independent of sanctions, and this too
would work to reduce vandalism in homogeneous blocks. The increase in graﬃti in more diverse
areas might also illustrate the need to mark one's territory in a context where several groups co-exist.
We understand the result on "Quality of housing" as the inability of more heterogeneous com-
munities to undertake collective action that would pressure the public housing oﬃce into improving
housing quality. This could be sustained (though we have no direct evidence to support this) by
beliefs in the housing directorate that it need not maintain public goods to high standards in het-
erogeneous housing projects because the likelihood of collective action against it is minimal. In this
sense, the resulting poor housing quality associated with ethnic diversity can be seen as an equi-
librium in which the lack of expectations of collective action would fail to incentivize the housing
directorate to make costly improvements.35 Coming back to the results concerning heating issues
displayed in Table 9, we can ﬁnd some support for this assumption: we ﬁnd that households living
in more diverse neighborhoods not only report more heating failures, but also report that this is due
to the poor quality of the heating equipment, an appliance typically under the control of the HLM
oﬃce.36
34Given that residents need to enter a code in order to gain entry into their building, it is unlikely these degradations
are coming from outsiders.
35The collective action could also inﬂuence mayor's oﬃce. But the political logic of the public housing support is
beyond the scope of the paper
36Another possible reason for having experienced coldness in the apartment that the household can mention is to
have restricted heating in order to save money. The results are not reported here, but we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect of
diversity on this outcome, in any speciﬁcation.
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Finally, we can think of two possible interpretations of the absence of any diversity eﬀect on
aggressions and robberies. First, this could result from more physical security provided by the city
and state police in more diverse neighborhoods. The second explanation would be that individuals
living in the public housing sector in general experience social anomie. In fact, one third (32.7
percent) of the HLM population, irrespective of diversity, declares to have no relationship at all with
individuals living in their same area. In addition, we ﬁnd that individuals living in a more diverse
neighborhood tend to report worse relationships with their neighbors. Even if this resentment im-
plies more violence directed towards neighbors, this eﬀect could be mitigated by reinforced police
protection, which goes back to our ﬁrst interpretation. Alternatively, individuals might channel their
resentment into damaging common property rather than persons and private property, explaining
the vandalism result.
To summarize, our interpretation is that diversity generates social anomie, i.e. the absence of
common rules and social norms. As a consequence of anomie, there is (a) a failure to impose social
sanctions and punish defectors, hence more vandalism, (b) a failure to generate collective action
to pressure the HLM oﬃces into improving housing quality, and (c) fewer opportunities for violent
confrontation at all levels of diversity. We also interpret the lack of an eﬀect of diversity on violence
by security provided at a higher level of administration, not subject to the constraints of local
diversity.
4.3.4 Interpretation of the channels based on Repairs
We bring additional evidence on the interpretation of the channels by looking at maintenance and
repairs performed in the building. Note ﬁrst that these outcomes add an objective dimension to
the previous subjective questions. The variation in the eﬀects of diversity on the number of repairs
depending on the type of public good also helps us to tease out the diﬀerent channels through which
diversity operates.
The Housing Survey asks whether elevators, staircase, windows, heating equipment, security
equipment, and so on, have been repaired or installed during the previous year. We build three
measures of repairs, corresponding to our three general outcomes. We deﬁne a ﬁrst variable tracking
repairs concerning staircase, windows, doors and lights of the commons, i.e repairs related to volun-
tary degradations, or vandalism. A second variable indicates repairs such as façade, or interventions
to improve, among other things, the heating system or insulation quality, i.e. repairs related to
the general quality of housing. Finally, we build a third variable accounting for the installation of
security equipment in the building, which can be related to conﬂicts outcomes. We then regress each
of these three variables (as well as less aggregated indicators of repairs) on the level of diversity of
the block, controlling for factors that could explain the number of repairs: the number of dwellings
in the building, and its date of construction. Table 10 reports these OLS estimates.
Column 1 of Table 10 reveals a positive and statistically signiﬁcant correlation between the
probability of repairs inside the building (windows, doors, lights... in the common areas) and local
diversity: the more the diversity, the more the work for repairing the eﬀects of vandalism. In the
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main regressions of the paper presented in section 4.3.2 (corresponding to the ﬁrst set of regressions
in Table 9), we found that voluntary degradations increase with diversity. This implies that the
larger number of repairs results from greater need due to a lack of publicly spirited social norms
rather than from greater responsiveness by the housing authorities to regular maintenance.
Then, Column 2 reveals a negative and statistically signiﬁcant correlation between the number
of substantial works in the building (façade, heating, insulation...) and local diversity: the more the
diversity, the less the work for improving the general quality of housing. In the main regressions
presented in section 4.3.2 (corresponding to the second set of regressions in Table 9), we found that
more diversity implies a lower quality of housing. Thus, it seems that more diverse neighborhoods
are deprived of such substantial work, although the inhabitants actually complain (individually to
survey enumerators) about the quality of housing. This supports our intuition that tenants in more
diverse neighborhoods are unable to engage in collective action to pressure the public housing oﬃces
into undertaking important works.
Finally Column 3 shows a positive and statistically signiﬁcant correlation between the existence
of security equipment and local diversity. In the main regressions presented in section 4.3.2 (corre-
sponding to the third set of regressions in Table 9), we found no impact of diversity on aggression
and robberies. The presence of security equipment in more diverse neighborhood might be part of
the explanation of the absence of diversity eﬀect on burglaries. In addition, it is supportive of our
idea that vandalism in the common areas of the buildings is imputable to the tenants, who have
access to the building.
5 Robustness checks on self-reported quality of public goods
One concern in the previous analysis is related to the subjective nature of the outcome variables
used in our study. Self-reported perceptions might reﬂect personal bias rather than be correlated
with objective measures of public good provision. Perhaps people are just happier when they are
surrounded by people more like themselves, and this is reﬂected in their answer to the quality of
housing. We conduct several tests challenging this alternative explanation of personal bias.
First, as mentioned in the previous section, the HS provides information about various types
of repairs and work that have been done in the building or in the housing unit over the previous
year. These variables present the advantage of being objective. The lower part of Table 10 reports
simple correlations between the various outcomes and the associated repairs. We ﬁnd that most
of our subjective outcomes are strongly and positively correlated with the existence of repairs, i.e.
objective outcomes, especially for the variables related to vandalism.37 This is our initial evidence
of the reliability of our subjective measures of housing quality and well-being.
We then conduct more formal tests. We replicate the regression on the dissatisfaction with
housing conditions (section 4.2) including interaction terms between diversity and the various ethnic
37An exception is the condition of the outside walls, which is negatively correlated with the probability that façade
work was done. This is not surprising as the assessment of the façade's condition is done at the time of the survey,
while repairs concern the previous year.
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groups. Those estimates reveal whether diﬀerent groups react in diﬀerent ways to the level of diver-
sity of their neighborhood. Column 2 of Table 11 shows that there does not seem to be a diﬀerent
eﬀect for the various groups, and the coeﬃcient for diversity remains unchanged (see Column 1 for
the baseline speciﬁcation). Then we concentrate on actual diﬀerences between "pure French" house-
holds38 and fully Maghrebian households' dissatisfaction with housing conditions. In particular, we
interact the dummies of being in a fully native French household or being in a fully Maghrebian
household with the ELF: none of the coeﬃcients is signiﬁcant (see Table 11, Column 3). Thus for
any given level of diversity, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the answers given by pure French
and fully Maghrebian households. In other words, the idea that bad opinions of housing conditions
are driven by average bad feelings due to being surrounded by foreigners can be rejected. Moreover,
including these additional controls only slightly aﬀects the magnitude of the ethnic diversity coeﬃ-
cient, and does not aﬀect its direction or its signiﬁcance.
An alternative test to show that subjective perceptions have an objective foundation is to look
at how much within-housing project variation there is in perceptions. We regress self-reported per-
ception on housing project ﬁxed eﬀects and individual characteristics. Once we control for housing
project ﬁxed eﬀects, assuming there is no within-project variation in public goods, the remainder
of the variation tells us if certain ethnic or socio-demographic groups are more likely to be posi-
tively or negatively biased. If perceptions have a high signal-to-noise ratio, there should be less
within-project variation because perceptions would be a good signal of project level public goods.
Table 12 shows the regressions of our main indicator of satisfaction about housing conditions on
individual characteristics. Column 1 shows the within-housing project estimates, exploiting vari-
ation across public housing. Column 2 shows the between-housing project estimates by including
housing project ﬁxed eﬀects. Column 1 shows that the only individual characteristics statistically
signiﬁcantly correlated with within-project variation in the perception of the environment are age
and household size. Income, education or the country of origin of the households are uncorrelated
with perceptions of the environment. We also compute the standard deviation in the perception
of the quality of housing between public housing projects and within public housing projects. The
standard deviation is almost twice as high across blocks (.801) than within blocks (.435), and this
diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant. In sum, low levels of within block variation on perceptions adds
conﬁdence that there is an objective foundation for tenants' subjective reports.
Finally, we also estimate the eﬀect of diversity on the perception of the quality of public goods
that are ﬁnanced by the city, the department or the state rather than locally ﬁnanced by the HLM
oﬃces. If there is a reporting bias in general, then, the eﬀect on all types of public goods should
be the same. If it is related to localized collective action failures, then the impact should only be
on locally provided/maintained public goods. Thus this test provides both an additional robustness
check on the channels through which diversity aﬀects public goods and on the absence of a reporting
bias. The local public goods we have focused on so far (except for individuals' protection) are
provided or maintained by the private company that owns and manages the public housing building.
38Both children and parents were born French in France.
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We now consider public goods that are managed at the city or department level. In the HS, three
public goods enter this category. The ﬁrst one is the perception of the quality of roads and streets
with the following question: "What is your opinion about the maintenance of the streets, roads
and public spaces in the area?". The second question measures the access to public transportation:
"What is your opinion about the accessibility of your area by public transportation?". The third
item measures the accessibility of the area by private transportation: "What is your opinion about
the accessibility of your area by private vehicles (parking, congestion)?". The answer ranges for all
three questions from 1 for good, 2 for neither good nor bad to 3 for bad. Table 13 reports the
OLS estimates, controlling for all the previous household and local characteristics in addition to
department ﬁxed eﬀects. We ﬁnd that ethnic fractionalization is neither correlated with the quality
of public spaces and roads in the areas (Column 1), nor with public transportation (Column 2),
nor with car parking and general congestion (Column 3). Again, our conﬁdence that the subjective
reports to enumerators on housing quality have an objective foundation is increased.
6 Further tests: Fractionalization and ethnic shares
The basic regressions measure ethnic diversity using a standard ELF, controlling for household,
building and neighborhood characteristics. Yet, as suggested by Vigdor (2002), it might be important
to control for ethnic group shares to get a more comprehensive set of covariates for diversity. Column
1 of Table 14 reports the results once we control for ethnic group shares.39 The estimated impact
of ELF is now even stronger than in the previous speciﬁcations, conﬁrming the robustness of our
result along this dimension.
Moreover, we run regressions replacing the fractionalization index by ethnic groups shares (Col-
umn 2 of Table 14), and by ethnic group shares and their square (Column 3 of Table 14), controlling
for the usual individual and local characteristics. Only one group (Maghrebian) seems to have a
signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on the dissatisfaction with housing conditions: the higher the share of
Magrhebians in a block (relative to the share of French), the more likely individuals are to complain
about their housing conditions. However, this negative eﬀect decreases with the share of Maghre-
bians. From this result, we infer that our measure of diversity reﬂects not only the actual ethnic
composition of the neighborhood, but also that some ethnic groups might have diﬀerent eﬀects on
self-reported perceptions of the quality of public spaces as they become a majority of the neighbor-
hood population. However, this result does not call into question the eﬀect of diversity per se on
which we have already reported (Column 1 of Table 14).
Finally, we re-run our main regressions using an alternative fractionalization index, trying to
encompass another dimension of diversity. More precisely, in order to account for communication
issues potentially related to the diversity of origins, we compute an alternative fractionalization
index based on a proxy for French speaking. We use information provided by the International
Organisation of La Francophonie to group countries according to the share of the population that is
39In Table 14, we aggregate the various nationalities at birth into six diﬀerent categories. The results are similar
when we work with more detailed shares for all nationalities. The share of native French is the omitted category.
26
French speaking (in 2010). Their classiﬁcation allows us to distinguish among six groups of countries:
countries which are not members of the organisation,40 countries in which French speakers represent
less than 5 percent of the population, countries in which French speakers represent between 5 and 15
percent of the population, countries in which French speakers represent between 16 and 35 percent
of the population, countries in which French speakers represent between 36 and 60 percent of the
population, and countries in which French speakers represent more than 60 percent of the population.
We then assign one of the six French-speaking levels to each individual (from the 1999 census
dataset), according to his or her nationality at birth. This sorting of individuals captures the
probability that they actually speak French. Finally, we compute a standard ELF for each block
(using the same methodology as for our main index of diversity) relying on the shares of the block
population belonging to one of the six groups.
We replicate the regressions of the paper41 using this alternative index instead of the one based
on nationality at birth. The results are reported in Table 15. Each coeﬃcient comes from a separate
regression. The columns indicate the four dependent variables under study. Panel A and panel B
respectively correspond to the measure of diversity used in each regression. Our results are unaﬀected
when we use the new index based on French speaking origin. This is not very surprising given that
the correlation between the two indices is very large (98.45 %).
7 Conclusion
This paper exploits French public housing policy as a natural experiment to identify the causal
eﬀect of diversity on well-being, social relationships and the quality of local public goods. We use
the exogenous allocation of households within public housing with respect to ethnic characteristics
in France to overcome the bias from endogenous residential sorting that reduces the conﬁdence in
previous empirical ﬁndings on fractionalization. The French Housing Survey provides in addition
a unique micro level of analysis within housing blocks, allowing a detailed analysis of the channels
through which diversity operates at the local level while the previous literature focused so far on
aggregate outcomes and channels. We ﬁnd that fractionalization has a negative impact on the norms
that punish defectors, leading to higher vandalism in the housing commons. Fractionalization also
undermines collective action for the improvement of the quality of housing. But in our context,
fractionalization has no eﬀect on civil conﬂicts, diversity being associated with social anomie within
the housing blocks rather than violent confrontations among neighbors.
This natural experiment calls for future research on the speciﬁc role of national, local and informal
institutions in mitigating or magnifying the eﬀect of ethnic diversity on the provision of public goods.
France is a country with a republican tradition that resolutely refuses to reify ethnic identiﬁcation
as a strategy to prevent the ethniﬁcation of everyday life. Yet we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect
of diversity on local public goods in its public housing sector, comparable to the association found
in the US localities where multiculturalist institutions regulate ethnic relations (Putnam, 2007) and
40For these countries, the organisation does not provide any data, but we can reasonably assume that the share of
French speaking population in non-member countries is close to zero.
41We replicate the regression of the dissatisfaction with housing conditions (Columns 1) as well as of the three
aggregate indices we obtained with the principal component analysis presented in Appendix B.
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in cases where public institutions are weak (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). However, on issues of
physical security in French public housing, the costs to ethnic diversity disappear. This may be due
to the emergence of informal institutions (such as in-group policing as in Fearon and Laitin, 1996)
or the supremacy of state-level institutions in which local diversity plays no role in the supply of
order. In any event, the results raise a puzzle, to be addressed in future research, on the general
power of institutional arguments in overcoming the negative implications of ethnic heterogeneity on
the provision of public goods.
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Table 1: Public Housing and Private Housing population characteristics (households heads, Housing
Survey 2002)
Public Housing Private Housing p-val Private Rental p-val
(HLM) (1)/(2) Housing market (1)/(4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Birth Country
France 78.63 88.34 0.000 86.16 0.000
Portugal 1.72 1.23 0.028 1.05 0.004
Spain 1.12 0.78 0.089 0.68 0.033
Italy 0.72 1.10 0.007 0.51 0.210
Other E.U. country 0.71 1.05 0.091 1.11 0.086
Turkey 1.24 0.30 0.000 0.51 0.000
Other European country 0.74 0.75 0.767 0.89 0.457
Maghreb 11.06 4.14 0.000 5.00 0.000
Other African country 2.66 1.06 0.000 2.17 0.327
Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos 0.69 0.41 0.016 0.51 0.227
Other countries 0.72 0.84 0.381 1.40 0.001
Nationality
French at birth 82.07 91.53 0.000 88.98 0.000
French by acquisition 5.81 3.72 0.000 3.47 0.000
Portuguese 1.33 1.00 0.090 1.02 0.202
Spanish 0.62 0.31 0.004 0.44 0.265
Italian 0.47 0.43 0.865 0.20 0.012
Other E.U. nationality 0.21 0.63 0.002 0.68 0.00
Turkish 1.01 0.19 0.000 0.41 0.000
Other European nationality 0.33 0.32 0.959 0.53 0.157
Maghrebian 6.34 1.02 0.000 2.10 0.000
Other African nationality 1.50 0.38 0.000 1.03 0.096
Cambodian, Vietnamese, Laotian 0.17 0.07 0.004 0.14 0.354
Other nationalities 0.14 0.40 0.016 0.99 0.000
Employment status
Employed 58.19 56.11 0.090 63.74 0.000
Unemployed 10.82 4.08 0.000 7.75 0.000
Inactive 30.99 39.81 0.000 28.51 0.004
Level of education (highest diploma obtained, individuals above 25 years old)
No diploma 28.26 14.85 0.000 14.40 0.000
Lower education 50.62 48.33 0.009 37.38 0.000
Baccalaureate 9.37 12.44 0.000 16.26 0.000
Higher education 11.74 24.38 0.000 31.96 0.000
Socio professional group
Farmer 0.18 1.96 0.000 0.67 0.000
Craftsman, Shopkeeper 1.50 5.03 0.000 3.99 0.000
Executive or other high position 3.64 13.03 0.000 14.14 0.000
Intermediate occupation 12.01 14.29 0.000 16.50 0.000
Employee 20.18 9.93 0.000 15.44 0.000
(Factory) Worker 31.10 16.02 0.000 20.35 0.000
Age (mean) 47.09 51.71 0.000 41.55 0.000
Annual income (mean) 12,226 18,041 0.000 15,902 0.000
Column 3 reports the p-value from a t-test for the null hypothesis that the mean of a given variable is the
same for the public housing (Column 1) and private housing (Column 2) populations. Column 5 reports the
p-value from a t-test for the null hypothesis that the mean of a given variable is the same for the public
housing population (Column 1) and for the population of tenants in the private housing market (Column 4).
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Table 2: Dissatisfaction with housing conditions by income level and ethnic origin in the Public
Housing sector
Dissatisfaction with Housing Conditions Mean Annual
Very Satisfying Average Insuﬃcient Very Income
satisfying insuﬃcient (in euros)
Ethnic origin
French born 13.8 44.01 28.54 9.9 3.75 12,758
Naturalized French 10.68 43.51 29.01 13.8 2.99 10,459
Other European 10.71 39.58 31.21 13.14 5.35 12,292
Maghrebian 8.42 33.27 34.83 18.21 5.26 8,603
African 7.82 20.77 41.29 25.14 4.99 7,865
Asian 0.00 60.64 11.25 28.11 0.00 12,892
Mean Annual Income 13,300 12,856 11,842 10,288 10,127
Table 3: Correlation between new inhabitants' nationality and share of the area population of the
same nationality
Private Housing Public Housing
(1) (2)
New inhabitant French at birth
Share of block population French at birth 0.366 ** 0.455
(0.143) (0.409)
New inhabitant naturalized French
Share of block population naturalized French 0.116** 0.161
(0.056) (0.220)
New inhabitant European
Share of block population European 0.322*** 0.576**
(0.101) (0.242)
New inhabitant Maghrebian
Share of block population Maghrebian 0.295*** 0.113
(0.099) (0.352)
New inhabitant African (except for Maghreb)
Share of block population African 0.214* 0.003
(0.127) (0.264)
New inhabitant Asian
Share of block population Asian 0.231 0.622
(0.222) (0.520)
Each of the coeﬃcients is estimated from a separate regression of individual's birth country on the share of
each ethnic group in the block into which he or she has just settled. The reported coeﬃcients are estimates
for the share of the individual's own ethnic group. The coeﬃcient for other ethnic groups' shares is available
from authors upon request. Additional controls are a quadratic function of age, gender, hourly wage (in log),
education, socio-professional category and department ﬁxed eﬀects. Regressions include 10,365 observations
in the private housing sector and 895 observations in the public housing sector. Robust standard errors
adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Rejection of HLM oﬀers and Ethnic diversity
Coeﬃcient associated with Ethnic Diversity
Rows: Dependent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Sample of households who currently live in public housing:
I. Probability of having declined 0.058 0.069 0.017 0.123
at least one HLM oﬀer during the (0.058) (0.063) (0.067) (0.0886)
previous application process
N 1,779 1,779 1,748 1,744
R² 0.001 0.021 0.023 0.089
II. Probability that the reason for having 0.162 0.061 0.017 -0.0310
declined an HLM oﬀer during the previous (0.144) (0.158) (0.171) (0.258)
application was "unpleasant environment"
N 417 417 415 414
R² 0.003 0.035 0.050 0.308
Panel B: Sample of households who are currently applying to public housing:
I. Probability of having declined -0.063 -0.043 -0.088 -0.116
at least one HLM oﬀer during the (0.057) (0.064) (0.071) (0.103)
current application process
N 1,192 1,192 1,173 1,171
R² 0.001 0.014 0.024 0.121
II. Probability that the reason for having 0.004 -0.007 -0.104 -0.122
declined an HLM oﬀer during the current (0.194) (0.237) (0.250) (0.506)
application was "unpleasant environment"
N 198 198 195 194
R² 0.000 0.083 0.115 0.590
Each of the coeﬃcients is estimated from a separate regression of each of the four dependent variables de-
scribed in the ﬁrst column on ethnic diversity. Column 1 does not include any control. Column 2 includes
households characteristics (gender, age, education, employment status and nationality of the head of house-
hold, total income (in log) of the household per unit of consumption, and household size). Column 3 adds
up the characteristics of the building (number of apartments (in log) and construction date). On top of
that, column 4 includes neighborhood characteristics (socio-economic background (Tabard index), and local
unemployment rate), as well as department ﬁxed eﬀects. In addition, a dummy variable indicating whether
the household already lives in the public housing sector is included in speciﬁcations 2 to 4 of Panel B. The
coeﬃcients for all the controls are available from authors upon request. Robust standard errors adjusted for
block clustering are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Do households having left their previous housing due to an unpleasant environment now
live in less diverse neighborhoods?
Dependent Variable: Main reason for leaving previous housing:
unpleasant environment (noise, lifestyle or insecurity)
Households who moved within the Households who moved toward the
Private Public Private Public
Housing sector Housing sector Housing sector Housing sector
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ethnic Diversity -0.073** 0.083 -0.061* 0.016
(0.030) (0.140) (0.032) (0.052)
Observations 5,955 627 6,560 1,793
R-squared 0.030 0.207 0.031 0.079
In each regression, we control for household characteristics (gender, age, education, income (in log), employ-
ment status, nationality, household size), building characteristics (number of apartments and construction
date), neighborhood characteristics (socio-economic background (Tabard index), and local unemployment
rate) and department ﬁxed eﬀects. The coeﬃcients for all the controls are available from authors upon
request.
Robust standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: Equality of distribution between the actual and simulated distributions of ethnic groups
shares across public housing blocks: percentage of departments where equality is not rejected.
t-tests K.S-test
Native French 100% 98.61%
Maghrebi 100% 98.01%
Both groups 100% 97.22%
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Table 7: Ethnic diversity and dissatisfaction with housing condition (To be continued)
Dependent Variable: Dissatisfaction with housing condition
(1) (2) (3)
Ethnic Diversity 0.915*** 0.611*** 0.368**
(0.090) (0.095) (0.129)
Household characteristics:
Gender -0.011 -0.011 -0.018
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032)
Age -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Level of Education -0.027*** -0.019** -0.013*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Income (log) -0.115*** -0.091** -0.043
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Household size 0.096*** 0.104*** 0.105***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Employment status (ref: Employed)
Unemployed 0.107* 0.082 0.056
(0.055) (0.054) (0.055)
Inactive -0.007 -0.014 -0.049
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Nationality (ref: French at birth)
Naturalized French -0.083 -0.090 -0.047
(0.065) (0.066) (0.066)
European 0.027 0.032 0.040
(0.093) (0.089) (0.089)
Maghrebian -0.118* -0.118* -0.097
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067)
African 0.114 0.097 0.109
(0.138) (0.139) (0.143)
Asian -0.600** -0.645** -0.623**
(0.275) (0.278) (0.311)
Other nationality 0.560 0.441 0.557
(0.614) (0.610) (0.633)
Each coeﬃcient is estimated from a separate regression, according to equation 2. Robust standard errors
adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Continued
Dependent Variable: Dissatisfaction with housing condition
(1) (2) (3)
Building characteristics:
Nb of dwellings (log) 0.021* 0.020
(0.011) (0.013)
Date of construction of the building (ref: before 1948)
1949 ≤ t < 1974 -0.013 0.017
(0.071) (0.077)
1975 ≤ t < 1981 -0.147* -0.094
(0.075) (0.081)
1982 ≤ t < 1989 -0.205** -0.109
(0.077) (0.082)
1990 ≤ t < 1998 -0.519*** -0.423***
(0.079) (0.085)
1999 ≤ t -0.816*** -0.751***
(0.175) (0.166)
Neighborhood characteristics:
Block unemployment rate 1.003***
(0.176)
Socio-economic No No Yes
background (Tabard)
Department No No Yes
Fixed Eﬀects
Intercept 3.499*** 3.382*** 4.377***
(0.284) (0.290) (0.394)
R-squared 0.083 0.107 0.128
Observations 4464 4388 4379
Each coeﬃcient is estimated from a separate regression, according to equation 2. Robust standard errors
adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics for each outcome in the public housing sector
Mean std dev Values
1. Degradation of the common areas due to vandalism
Damaging the premises 1.637 0.778 1 - 3
Graﬃti 0.257 0.437 0 - 1
Garbage on the ﬂoor 0.188 0.391 0 - 1
Broken windows 0.136 0.343 0 - 1
Broken doors 0.127 0.333 0 - 1
Broken light bulbs 0.094 0.291 0 - 1
Broken mailboxes 0.154 0.361 0 - 1
Vandalism on the elevator 0.085 0.279 0 - 1
Noise in daytime 1.595 0.748 1 - 3
Noise in night time 1.374 0.627 1 - 3
2. Poor quality of housing due to low maintenance
Care of the common areas 1.593 0.752 1 - 3
Condition of the outside walls 2.433 0.962 1 - 5
Cold in the apartment 0.175 0.380 0 - 1
Cold due to bad insulation 0.065 0.246 0 - 1
Cold due to breakdown in heating equipment 0.045 0.207 0 - 1
Cold due to poor equipment 0.059 0.236 0 - 1
Quality of soundprooﬁng 1.981 0.823 1 - 3
Breakdown of the elevator 0.155 0.362 0 - 1
Toilet malfunction 0.153 0.360 0 - 1
3. Civil Conﬂict
Robberies 0.095 0.293 0 - 1
Aggressions 0.081 0.273 0 - 1
Burglary (or attempt) 0.041 0.198 0 - 1
Depending on the questions, we have between 4,310 and 5,189 observations
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Table 9: Diversity and Public goods: separate outcomes (public housing)
Estimated Eﬀect of Ethnic Diversity
(1) (2) (3)
1. Degradation of the common areas due to vandalism
Damaging the premises 0.938*** 0.813*** 0.630***
(0.096) (0.099) (0.127)
Graﬃti 0.606*** 0.383*** 0.313***
(0.048) (0.053) (0.063)
Garbage on the ﬂoor 0.531*** 0.349*** 0.298***
(0.047) (0.049) (0.060)
Broken windows 0.365*** 0.235*** 0.200***
(0.042) (0.046) (0.053)
Broken doors 0.316*** 0.194*** 0.151**
(0.041) (0.045) (0.051)
Broken light bulbs 0.339*** 0.265*** 0.271***
(0.037) (0.040) (0.048)
Broken mailboxes 0.451*** 0.319*** 0.330***
(0.044) (0.048) (0.058)
Vandalism on the elevator 0.291*** 0.174*** 0.168***
(0.039) (0.041) (0.047)
Noise in daytime 0.656*** 0.406*** 0.288**
(0.076) (0.082) (0.106)
Noise in night time 0.610*** 0.473*** 0.313***
(0.064) (0.071) (0.091)
2. Poor quality of housing due to low maintenance
Care of the common areas 0.546*** 0.487*** 0.384**
(0.087) (0.093) (0.121)
Condition of the outside walls 0.583*** 0.469*** 0.260*
(0.103) (0.109) (0.145)
Cold in the apartment 0.224*** 0.174*** 0.136**
(0.039) (0.043) (0.059)
Cold due to bad insulation 0.087** 0.059** 0.021
(0.027) (0.029) (0.040)
Cold due to breakdown in 0.014 0.006 0.007
heating equipment (0.025) (0.028) (0.037)
Cold due to poor equipment 0.107*** 0.081** 0.084**
(0.025) (0.027) (0.036)
Quality of soundprooﬁng 0.816*** 0.365*** 0.021
(0.079) (0.082) (0.110)
Breakdown of the elevator 0.366*** 0.165*** 0.106**
(0.042) (0.043) (0.051)
Toilet malfunction 0.084** 0.078* 0.133**
(0.037) (0.041) (0.051)
3. Civil Conﬂict
Robberies 0.051* 0.059* 0.043
(0.028) (0.031) (0.039)
Aggressions 0.057** 0.035 -0.024
(0.026) (0.027) (0.038)
Burglary (or attempt) 0.023 0.016 -0.001
(0.018) (0.021) (0.027)
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Building characteristics No Yes Yes
Neighborhood characteristics No No Yes
Department ﬁxed eﬀects No No Yes
Observations 4,464 4,388 4,379
R-squared 0.014 0.014 0.033
Each coeﬃcient is estimated from a separate regression, according to equation 2. Each line correspond to a diﬀerent
regression, where the dependent variable is the one reported in the ﬁrst column. Each index is regressed on ethnic
diversity, controlling gradually for the usual household, building and neighborhood characteristics as speciﬁed at the
bottom of the Table. Robust standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
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Table 10: Type of repairs done
Vandalism Poor Housing Quality Civil Conﬂicts
Work in the commons: Major works: Security Equipment:
staircase, doors, façade, heating, entry code,
lights, glass elevator, toilets locks
(1) (2) (3)
Ethnic Diversity 0.134** -0.213*** 0.141***
(0.054) (0.069) (0.041)
R-squared 0.024 0.012 0.010
N 2220 2220 2220
Correlation (in %) with perception of degradations
1. Vandalism
Damaging the premises 5.79***
Graﬃti 16.94***
Garbage on the ﬂoor 14.35***
Broken windows 11.86***
Broken doors 13.74***
Broken light bulbs 12.24***
Broken mailboxes 13.10***
Vandalism on the elevator 13.54*** 12.72***
2. Poor Housing Quality
Condition of the outside walls -3.46***
Cold in the apartment 3.89***
Cold due to bad insulation 1.29
Cold due to breakdown in heating equipment 4.70***
Cold due to poor equipment 0.012
Breakdown of the elevator -0.001
Toilet malfunction 4.31***
3. Civil Conﬂict
Robberies 2.52***
Aggressions 4.15***
Burglary (or attempt) 2.35***
Robust standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11: Are results driven by some major ethnic groups disliking being around foreigners ? (to be
continued)
Dissatisfaction with Housing Conditions
(1) (2) (3)
Ethnic Diversity 0.368** 0.359** 0.313**
(0.129) (0.141) (0.154)
Household characteristics:
Gender -0.018 -0.018 -0.018
(0.032) (0.033) (0.032)
Age -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education -0.013* -0.013* -0.012*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Income (log) -0.043 -0.045 -0.038
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Household size 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.094***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
Employment status(ref: Employed)
Unemployed 0.056 0.057 0.055
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Inactive -0.049 -0.049 -0.051
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Nationality (ref: French at birth)
Naturalized French -0.047 -0.030
(0.066) (0.144)
European 0.040 0.043
(0.089) (0.197)
Maghrebian -0.097 -0.095
(0.067) (0.186)
African 0.109 -0.239
(0.143) (0.324)
Asian -0.623** -0.150
(0.311) (0.814)
Other nationality 0.557 0.788
(0.633) (1.203)
Interaction terms: ELF * origin
ELF * naturalized French -0.052
(0.373)
ELF * European -0.007
(0.542)
ELF * Maghrebian -0.001
(0.401)
ELF * African 0.894
(0.751)
ELF * Asian -1.123
(1.340)
ELF * Other nationality -1.136
(4.552)
Each coeﬃcient is estimated from a separate regression, according to equation 2. Robust standard errors
adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11: Continued
Dependent Variable: Dissatisfaction with housing condition
(1) (2) (3)
Major groups in HLM: Native French and Maghrebians
Native French household -0.043
(0.056)
ELF * Native French household 0.027
(0.169)
Maghrebian household 0.138
(0.259)
ELF * Maghrebian household -0.300
(0.559)
Building characteristics:
Nb of dwellings (log) 0.020 0.020 0.019
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Date of construction of the building (ref: before 1948)
1949 ≤ t < 1974 0.017 0.017 0.022
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077)
1975 ≤ t < 1981 -0.094 -0.094 -0.087
(0.081) (0.082) (0.082)
1982 ≤ t < 1989 -0.109 -0.109 -0.104
(0.082) (0.082) (0.082)
1990 ≤ t < 1998 -0.423*** -0.424*** -0.421***
(0.085) (0.086) (0.086)
1999 ≤ t -0.751*** -0.753*** -0.748***
(0.166) (0.166) (0.165)
Neighborhood characteristics:
Block unemployment rate 1.003*** 0.999*** 0.995***
(0.176) (0.176) (0.175)
Socio-economic Yes Yes Yes
background (Tabard)
Department Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Eﬀects
Intercept 3.991*** 4.010*** 4.004***
(0.360) (0.363) (0.353)
R-squared 0.128 0.127 0.127
Observations 4379 4379 4379
Each coeﬃcient is estimated from a separate regression, according to equation 2. Robust standard errors
adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 12: Variation in Perception of Housing quality: Within and Between Public Housing Blocks
Dissatisfaction with Housing conditions
Within correlation Between correlation
Gender 0.01 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04)
Age -0.00* -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00)
Education 0.01 -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01)
Income (log) -0.07* -0.09**
(0.04) (0.04)
Unemployed 0.05 0.08
(0.07) (0.06)
Inactive -0.08 0.02
(0.06) (0.06)
Household size 0.09*** 0.13***
(0.02) (0.01)
Naturalized French -0.11 -0.00
(0.08) (0.09)
European -0.00 0.19*
(0.11) (0.11)
Maghrebian -0.09 -0.01
(0.09) (0.08)
African -0.05 0.44**
(0.15) (0.20)
Asian -0.34 -0.56
(0.52) (0.53)
Other nationality -0.11 0.14
(0.79) (0.53)
Building size (log) 0.05***
(0.01)
Housing Project FE Yes No
R-squared 0.056 0.172
Observations 5105 5105
Robust standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
40
Table 13: Ethnic Diversity and Distant public goods
Maintenance of Accessibility to Accessibility to
streets public transports private transports
Ethnic Diversity 0.158 -0.050 0.142
(0.096) (0.134) (0.102)
Gender 0.001 -0.036 0.015
(0.022) (0.028) (0.024)
Age -0.000 -0.002** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education -0.004 0.001 0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Income (log) 0.013 0.010 0.038*
(0.024) (0.030) (0.023)
Unemployed 0.012 0.059 -0.027
(0.036) (0.041) (0.037)
Inactive 0.039 0.104** 0.008
(0.032) (0.039) (0.032)
Household size 0.018** 0.002 0.011
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
Naturalized French -0.096** -0.009 0.030
(0.045) (0.055) (0.048)
European 0.040 0.023 -0.099*
(0.070) (0.067) (0.060)
Maghrebian -0.057 -0.005 -0.069
(0.045) (0.051) (0.046)
African 0.037 0.119 -0.032
(0.095) (0.097) (0.101)
Asian -0.105 -0.128 0.176
(0.183) (0.282) (0.246)
Other nationality -0.330*** 0.112 -0.376***
(0.073) (0.343) (0.083)
Block unemployment rate 0.386*** -0.102 -0.041
(0.114) (0.144) (0.112)
Intercept 0.814** 4.365*** 0.783***
(0.276) (0.471) (0.233)
Department Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Socio economic backgrounds Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.053 0.283 0.101
N 4451 4451 4451
Robust
standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 14: Ethnic Diversity and Dissatisfaction with Housing conditions  Robustness Checks (to be
continued)
Dissatisfaction with Housing Conditions
(1) (2) (3)
Ethnic Diversity 1.392**
(0.530)
Household characteristics:
Gender -0.018 -0.019 -0.021
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Age -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education -0.013* -0.014* -0.014*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Income (log) -0.041 -0.041 -0.040
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Household size 0.105*** 0.104*** 0.105***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Employment status (ref: Employed)
Unemployed 0.050 0.059 0.051
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Inactive -0.050 -0.049 -0.051
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Nationality (ref: French at birth)
Naturalized French -0.044 -0.043 -0.036
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
European 0.059 0.058 0.062
(0.088) (0.089) (0.089)
Maghrebian -0.107 -0.106 -0.108
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
African 0.092 0.098 0.097
(0.143) (0.143) (0.143)
Asian -0.615* -0.607* -0.605*
(0.316) (0.318) (0.315)
Other nationality 0.577 0.565 0.569
(0.630) (0.632) (0.634)
Building characteristics:
Nb of dwellings (log) 0.017 0.020 0.019
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Date of construction of the building (ref: before 1948)
1949 ≤ t < 1974 0.007 0.022 0.012
(0.077) (0.077) (0.076)
1975 ≤ t < 1981 -0.115 -0.101 -0.110
(0.082) (0.081) (0.081)
1982 ≤ t < 1989 -0.134 -0.122 -0.129
(0.082) (0.082) (0.082)
1990 ≤ t < 1998 -0.444*** -0.438*** -0.439***
(0.085) (0.086) (0.085)
1999 ≤ t -0.769*** -0.770*** -0.751***
(0.168) (0.168) (0.170)
Robust standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 42
Table 14: Continued
Dependent Variable: Dissatisfaction with housing condition
(1) (2) (3)
Neighborhood characteristics:
Block unemployment rate 0.909*** 0.954*** 0.911***
(0.175) (0.175) (0.174)
Socio-economic Yes Yes Yes
background (Tabard)
Department Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Eﬀects
Ethnic group shares:
% European -3.249** -0.928* -2.273**
(1.007) (0.493) (0.961)
% Maghrebian -1.092 0.633** 2.014***
(0.707) (0.277) (0.521)
% African -1.203 0.941 1.218
(1.101) (0.823) (1.428)
% Asian -2.186* 0.167 0.315
(1.323) (0.974) (1.838)
% Other nationality -1.488* 0.260 -0.263
(0.855) (0.501) (0.864)
Squared ethnic group shares:
(% European)2 7.587*
(4.332)
(% Maghrebian)2 -3.767**
(1.220)
(% African)2 -4.225
(7.839)
(% Asian)2 -4.792
(14.523)
(% Other nationality)2 1.351
(2.895)
Intercept 4.009*** 4.071*** 4.023***
(0.361) (0.362) (0.363)
R-squared 0.131 0.129 0.131
Observations 4379 4379 4379
Robust standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 15: A proxy for language fractionalization
Dependent Dissatisfaction with Neglect of Quality of Insecurity
Variable: housing conditions the commons housing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A:
Diversity based on 0.368*** 1.532*** 0.727*** 0.0252
nationality at birth (0.129) (0.422) (0.263) (0.183)
Observations 4,379 1,693 3,797 4,379
R-squared 0.156 0.201 0.192 0.063
Panel B:
Diversity based on
share of the population 0.366*** 1.560*** 0.741** -0.0377
speaking French in (0.141) (0.472) (0.290) (0.199)
country of origin
Observations 4,365 1,689 3,788 4,365
R-squared 0.157 0.202 0.193 0.064
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Controls: head of household characteris-
tics (gender, age, education, activity status, aggregated nationality), household characteristics (log of in-
come, household size), building characteristics (date of construction, log number of housing units), socio-
economic background of the neighborhood (unemployment rate, Nicole Tabbard classiﬁcation), department
ﬁxed-eﬀects. Each coeﬃcient comes from a separate regression. The columns indicate the four dependent
variables under study. Panel A and panel B respectively correspond to the measure of diversity used in each
regression.
Appendix
A. Fractionalization index and French blocks
Table 16: Housing blocks in the Census 1999
Number of blocks sampled per department Number of individuals sampled per block
All France HLM Population All France HLM Population
Mean 2,894.5 932.9 24.6 18.4
Median 2,236 740.5 15 8
Table 17: Fractionalization by nationality at birth in housing blocks
1999 Census 2002 Housing Survey
Whole France Private Housing HLM Population Whole France HLM Population
Mean 16.65 14.29 27.68 16.23 25.33
Median 11.82 10.29 25.18 11.98 23.37
Std Dev 15.33 13.36 18.75 14.2 17.94
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum 91.83 91.83 91.3 84.94 80.26
N 6,643,287 5,027,235 1,616,052 28,744 4,465
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Figure 1: Fractionalization by nationality at birth within private and public housing blocks, Census
1999
B. Principal component analysis
To decompose the various eﬀects of fractionalization, we alternatively run an exploratory analysis
to extract the main dimensions with which the various questions reported in the HS correlate the
most. We then interpret those factors as diﬀerent dimensions of the quality of public spaces that
could be aﬀected by ethnic diversity. The principal component analysis lets the correlation patterns
among the various questions emerge endogenously from the data, rather than grouping them in an
arbitrary way. We select (following the Kaiser criterion) three main factors with eigenvalues higher
than one that emerged from the principal component analysis of the relevant survey questions. Table
18 reports those three factors and the rotated matrix of correlations between those factors and each
question. Three main patterns of correlation emerge that refer broadly speaking to three dimensions
of the quality of the public space. Table 8 reports descriptive statistics of the various questions.
For each variable, a lower value represents a better outcome (e.g. greater care of the commons, less
graﬃti, better soundprooﬁng...).
We then create summary indices from the three groups of questions identiﬁed in the previous
section. We run a principal component analysis on each group of questions, and take the ﬁrst
principal component of each. We refer to those indices as "Neglect of the public areas", "Quality of
housing" and "Civil conﬂict". The higher the indices, the more unfavorable are the outcomes. We
also check the robustness of the results by looking at alternative summary indices, taking the sum
of the questions belonging to each group, or performing a mean eﬀect analysis for each group. The
estimates for these alternative indices are reported in Appendix C, yielding similar results.
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Table 18: Principal component analysis
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Care of the commons 0.142 0.225 0.053
Voluntary degradations of the commons 0.675 0.172 0.091
Graﬃti on the walls 0.209 -0.126 0.023
Trash in the commons 0.247 0.047 0.085
Broken doors in the commons 0.591 0.166 0.123
Broken lights in the commons 0.564 0.072 0.031
Degradation of mail boxes 0.528 0.130 0.034
Broken elevators 0.528 -0.031 -0.041
Quality of the building's façade -0.038 0.239 -0.030
Problem with heating in the building -0.007 0.336 0.029
Quality of soundprooﬁng 0.042 0.703 0.004
Noise disturbance during the day in the housing 0.060 0.831 0.052
Noise disturbance at night in the housing 0.113 0.807 0.105
Victim or witness of aggression in the neighborhood 0.098 0.136 0.746
Victim or witness of robbery in the neighborhood -0.006 0.028 0.810
Table 19 shows the eﬀect of ethnic fractionalization on those three diﬀerent dimensions: "Neglect
of the public areas", "Quality of housing" and "Civil conﬂict".42 For each index, we run separate
regressions on ethnic diversity controlling for the usual household, building and neighborhood char-
acteristics as speciﬁed at the bottom of each column in Table 19.
As can be surmised from an examination of three sets of regressions on Table 19, the results
relying on categories derived from the principal component analysis rather than the categories that
followed from the theoretical literature on public goods, and relying on identical model speciﬁcations,
are basically similar. For the eﬀect of ethnic diversity on the synthetic index Neglect of Public Areas
(see the ﬁrst panel of Table 19), the eﬀect of ethnic diversity is always statistically signiﬁcant at the
1 percent level, and is substantively sizeable. For the index of Poor Housing Quality, the coeﬃcient
associated with ethnic diversity is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level for the ﬁrst two
speciﬁcations but only at the 5 percent level when all the controls are included. However, as with
the results using the theoretically inferred categorization in the main body of the paper, its eﬀect
is much lower than for the index for voluntary degradations. For the index of Civil Conﬂict, the
data here show that ethnic diversity does not have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on civil conﬂicts
in the public housing sector in our full speciﬁcation, as is the case in our main results. In sum,
categorization by principal components analysis yields quite similar results as to those reported
with the theoretically derived categorization.
42The coeﬃcient estimates for the control variables are not reported here but are very similar to those reported in
Table 7. The full regression results are available upon request.
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Table 19: Ethnic Diversity and Public Goods (public housing)
Ethnic Diversity
(1) (2) (3)
Index for Neglect of Public Areas
1.791*** 1.514*** 1.532***
(0.322) (0.330) (0.422)
Observations 1,700 1,693 1,693
R-squared 0.060 0.084 0.134
Index for Poor Quality of Housing
2.132*** 1.382*** 0.727**
(0.187) (0.200) (0.263)
Observations 3,869 3,805 3,797
R-squared 0.092 0.128 0,161
Index for Civil Conﬂicts
0.330** 0.273* 0.025
(0.129) (0.139) (0.183)
Observations 4,464 4,388 4,379
R-squared 0.014 0.014 0.033
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Building characteristics No Yes Yes
Neighborhood characteristics No No Yes
Department ﬁxed eﬀects No No Yes
Each coeﬃcient is estimated from a separate regression, according to equation 2. The four dependent variables
considered include the answer to the general opinion / dissatisfaction question and the three indices that
were derived from principal component analysis as described in section 4.2. Each index is regressed on
either ethnic diversity, controlling for the usual household and neighborhood characteristics unless otherwise
indicated. Robust standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
C. Alternative summary indices - Mean eﬀect analysis
As a robustness check, we have also experimented with alternative indexes for measuring these three
dimensions of housing conditions. We have ﬁrst looked at basic indices deﬁned as the sum of the
outcome variables related to each dimension. For each of the three dimensions considered, we thus
obtain a variable which increases with the number of adverse outcomes one faces. Table 20 reports
the results of the regression of these three indices on ethnic diversity for our favorite speciﬁcation.
Our results are robust to these alternative indices: the eﬀect of ethnic diversity is still strongly
signiﬁcant for the index of Housing Quality, and is even stronger for the index for Neglect of Public
Areas. As noted previously, there is no eﬀect of diversity on civil conﬂicts.
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Table 20: Diversity and Public goods: sum of the various outcomes, Public Housing
Ethnic Diversity
(1)
1. Neglect of the Public Areas
Sum of the outcome variables 2.321***
(0.575)
2. Quality of Housing
Sum of the outcome variables 1.511***
(0.360)
3. Civil Conﬂict
Sum of the outcome variables 0.029
(0.059)
Socio-economic
Background of area Yes***
Department ﬁxed eﬀects Yes***
Each coeﬃcient is estimated from a separate regression, according to equation 2. The three dependent
variables considered are the three indices reported in bold. Each index is regressed on either ethnic diversity,
controlling for the usual household and neighborhood characteristics unless otherwise indicated. Robust
standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
To be more thorough, we next perform a mean eﬀect analysis. Following Kling, Liebman and
Katz (2007), we construct summary indices aggregating information across the various related out-
comes for each of the three dimensions studied above. To build the three summary indices, we
ﬁrst normalize each outcome using a pseudo-control group deﬁned by individuals living in blocks
characterized by a below-median fractionalization index, as in Glennerster, Miguel and Rothenberg
(2010). Let Yk be the k
th of K related outcomes. Each standardized outcome Y ∗k is obtained by
subtracting the mean µk and dividing by the standard deviation σk of the outcome variable among
the low diversity pseudo-control group: Y ∗k = (Yk − µk)/σk. We then average the related standard-
ized outcomes to form the summary index : Y ∗ =
∑
k Y
∗
k /K. Accordingly, our summary index for
neglect of the commons averages nine standardized measures including graﬃti, broken mailboxes,
broken elevator, low care of the commons, voluntary degradations and garbage on the ﬂoor; the
index for poor housing conditions averages ﬁve standardized measures of quality of apartment's
soundprooﬁng, of eﬃciency of the heating system, and of the general state of the outside walls; and
ﬁnally the civil conﬂict indicator averages standardized measures of robbery and personal aggression.
Table 21 presents the raw and normalized components of the three broad summary indices. The
ﬁrst column displays the mean of each outcome among the low-diversity group. The normalized
outcomes for this pseudo-control group are displayed in column 2, with mean equal to zero by con-
struction. Column 3 reports the diﬀerence between the mean of each outcome among the households
living in high diversity neighborhoods (a treated group of sorts) and that of the low diversity pop-
ulation. All but one of the diﬀerences are positive indicating that the average outcome is generally
worse in more heterogeneous areas. Column 4 shows the diﬀerence between the normalized outcomes
for treatment and control group, and allows for a more comprehensive reading. For instance, we
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know from column 3 that the raw diﬀerence between care of the commons in low and high diversity
areas is of 0.14. Column 4 now tells us that this diﬀerence is of 0.19 standard deviations, relative to
the control group standard deviation.
Table 22 reports mean eﬀect estimates from regressing the summary indices for negligence,
quality of housing and civil conﬂicts on ethnic diversity and other variables, as in speciﬁcation 2.
The coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity is the mean eﬀect size. As expected, for the negligence index and
the quality of housing index, mean eﬀect estimates of ethnic diversity are strongly positive (column
1). Using summary indices also allows us to compare the mean eﬀect of diversity on those two
normalized outcomes: lines 1 and 2 of Table 22 tell us that ethnic diversity has a more adverse
impact on the neglect of common areas than on the average quality of housing. This gives us an
insight concerning the mechanisms at play: high levels of ethnic diversity are more likely to generate
uncivic behaviors that could be avoided by higher quality social norms. By contrast, the mean eﬀect
estimate in the third line indicates that ethnic diversity plays no role on civil conﬂicts.
Table 21: Components of Summary Indices,Public Housing
Low ELF High ELF
- low ELF
Raw Norm Raw Norm
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Neglect of the Public Areas
Care of the commons 1.49 0 0.14 0.19
Damaging in the premises 1.45 0 0.25 0.36
Graﬃti 0.63 0 0.03 0.07
Garbage on the ﬂoor 0.42 0 0.08 0.16
Broken glass 0.31 0 0.06 0.13
Broken doors 0.32 0 0.01 0.01
Broken light bulbs 0.18 0 0.07 0.18
Broken mailboxes 0.33 0 0.09 0.19
Broken elevators 0.14 0 0.1 0.28
2. Quality of Housing
Condition of the outside walls 2.42 0 0.01 0.01
Quality of soundprooﬁng 1.83 0 0.23 0.28
Noisy in daytime 1.48 0 0.16 0.22
Noisy in night time 1.27 0 0.15 0.27
Cold in the apartment 0.14 0 0.08 0.23
3. Civil Conﬂict
Robberies 0.08 0 0.01 0.05
Aggressions 0.06 0 0.02 0.08
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Table 22: Diversity and Public goods: mean eﬀect estimates, Public Housing
Ethnic Diversity
(1)
1. Neglect of the Public Areas
Mean eﬀect estimate 0.545***
(0.130)
2. Quality of Housing
Mean eﬀect estimate 0.467***
(0.107)
3. Civil Conﬂict
Mean eﬀect estimate 0.050
(0.112)
Socio-economic
Background of area Yes***
Department ﬁxed eﬀects Yes***
Each coeﬃcient is estimated from a separate regression, according to equation 2. The three dependent
variables considered are the three summary indices indices reported in bold. Each index is regressed on
either ethnic diversity, controlling for the usual household and neighborhood characteristics unless otherwise
indicated. Robust standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
The broad picture drawn in the three previous sets of regressions is largely conﬁrmed by the
regressions of each separate normalized outcome. The corresponding mean eﬀect estimates of ethnic
diversity are presented in table 23. Although diversity has no signiﬁcant impact on a few outcomes,
such as broken glass or broken light bulbs in the commons, we still have a very strong negative
eﬀect of diversity on every other negligence or housing quality outcome in the public sector. As
noted earlier, the mean eﬀects estimates for negligence outcomes are on average larger than those
for housing quality. The eﬀect measured on broken light bulbs is the strongest, with a more than
one standard deviation diﬀerence between low and high diversity neighborhoods, while the lowest
is obtained for the quality of sound prooﬁng, with a diﬀerence of about one third in terms of its
standard deviation. Turning to civil conﬂicts, the mean eﬀect estimates on robberies and direct
aggressions are both insigniﬁcant in the public housing sector in our favorite speciﬁcation.
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Table 23: Ethnic diversity and disaggregated housing outcomes : mean eﬀects analysis, Public
Housing
Ethnic diversity
(1) (2)
1. Neglect of the Public Areas
Care of the commons 0.752*** 0.549***
(0.124) (0.164)
Damaging the premises 1.271*** 1.019***
(0.140) (0.183)
Graﬃti 0.387** 0.488**
(0.151) (0.216)
Garbage on the ﬂoor 0.668*** 0.625***
(0.162) (0.227)
Broken glass 0.475*** 0.368
(0.182) (0.238)
Broken doors 0.228 0.110
(0.176) (0.241)
Broken light bulbs 0.878*** 1.049***
(0.187) (0.248)
Broken mailboxes 0.652*** 0.927***
(0.176) (0.239)
Broken elevators 0.694*** 0.656**
(0.227) (0.288)
2. Quality of Housing
Condition of the outside walls 0.629*** 0.414***
(0.109) (0.151)
Quality of soundprooﬁng 0.963*** 0.393***
(0.099) (0.138)
Noisy in daytime 0.935*** 0.613***
(0.110) (0.148)
Noisy in night time 1.096*** 0.676***
(0.121) (0.159)
Cold in the apartment 0.634*** 0.418**
(0.128) (0.184)
3. Civil Conﬂict
Robberies 0.207** 0.149
(0.103) (0.140)
Aggressions 0.231** -0.0489
(0.104) (0.149)
Socio eco. background
and department. ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes
Each entry is the coeﬃcient estimate on ethnic diversity from a separate regression.
All the regressions include controls for household characteristics.
Robust standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses. The components of the three summary
indices are the variables listed below each of them. Descriptive statistics for these outcomes are in Table 8.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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